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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a man who suddenly experiences severe chest pain, 
shortness of breath, and increased sweating.  This man is rushed to 
an emergency room, where he is diagnosed with coronary artery dis-
ease, a condition that constricts the small blood vessels which supply 
oxygen and blood to the heart and can lead to a heart attack.1  What 
if, with the mere push of a button, a physician could establish an 
ideal treatment for this patient, taking into consideration the quality 
of various treatment options, as well as the patient’s age, gender, 
race, ethnicity, co-morbidities such as diabetes, and a variety of other 
factors that are all unique to this patient? 
 
 1 See Concise Medical Dictionary, OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE (Elizabeth Martin ed., 8th ed. 
2010), http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.
e11281 (providing a definition of coronary artery disease); see also Mayo Clinic Staff, Coro-
nary Artery Disease:  Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/coronary-
artery-disease/DS00064/DSECTION=symptoms. 
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Undeniably, there is a growing interest in such personalized med-
icine among both the American public and the federal government.2  
Unfortunately, such individualized treatment is not currently possible 
for heart disease, nor is it available for a variety of other relatively 
common health afflictions.  A patient who presents in a modern-day 
U.S. emergency room with coronary artery disease would likely dis-
cover different doctors recommending widely varying treatments.  
But these variations are mainly a result of lingering uncertainties re-
garding the best approach for treating this condition, rather than ef-
forts to provide patients with individualized treatments.3 
Achieving such individualized and highly effective treatment is an 
important underlying goal of clinical comparative effectiveness re-
search (CER),4 a term which is just beginning to trickle into the voca-
bulary of average Americans.5  Yet greater personalization of medical 
 
 2 See Shara Yurkiewicz, The Prospects for Personalized Medicine, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 
14–15 (2010) (noting that “[t]he federal government has demonstrated its commitment 
to personalized medicine” and describing how the direct-to-consumer market for genetic 
testing has expanded rapidly in recent years). 
 3 See Michael S. Lauer, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  The View from the NHLBI, 53 J. AM. 
C. CARDIOLOGY 1084, 1084 (2009) (describing regional variations in the practice of medi-
cine); David Haynes, Health Care Research:  Finding What Works, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
May 19, 2010, at A12 (indicating that patients in Wisconsin were 107% more likely to 
have angioplasty if they lived in Milwaukee rather than La Crosse and 120% more likely 
to have heart bypass surgery if they lived in Wausau rather than Madison); see also CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2975, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
MEDICAL TREATMENTS:  ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE (2007), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-ComparativeEffective
ness.pdf#37 (“Without hard evidence . . . decisions about what treatments to recommend 
often depend on the individual experience and judgment of physicians.”); Patrick H. 
Conway & Carolyn Clancy, Editorial, Charting a Path from Comparative Effectiveness Funding 
to Improved Patient-Centered Health Care, 303 JAMA 985, 986 (2010) (noting that “[t]he chal-
lenges and frustrations for clinicians and patients of daily clinical decisions necessarily 
made under conditions of uncertainty are self-evident”); Alan M. Garber & Sean R. Tunis, 
Does Comparative-Effectiveness Research Threaten Personalized Medicine, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1925, 1926 (2009) (noting that “with too few appropriately designed studies, physicians, 
patients, and families have often had little guidance about which patients were most likely 
to benefit from a clinical strategy”). 
 4 See Garber & Tunis, supra note 3, at 1926 (“Perhaps the most important goal of CER is to 
broaden and deepen . . . information [about which patients are most likely to benefit 
from a clinical strategy], providing tools for matching medical care much more precisely 
to individual patients.”); see also Robert Epstein & J. Russell Teagarden, Comparative Effec-
tiveness and Personalized Medicine:  Evolving Together or Apart?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1783, 1786 
(2010) (“Comparative effectiveness research can . . . extend the potential applications of 
personalized medicine.”); John K. Iglehart, The Political Fight over Comparative Effectiveness 
Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1757, 1759 (2010) (quoting the president of Friends of Cancer 
Research as saying that it has become “clear that [comparative effectiveness research] 
could be a step toward ‘personalized’ medicine”). 
 5 See infra Part I.A (providing an array of definitions on what the term “comparative effec-
tiveness” encompasses). 
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treatment is actually just one of many benefits that can be derived 
from increased use of CER. 
Comparative effectiveness research also has the ability to save lives 
and generate tremendous savings in the health care system, render-
ing it a critical “game-changer” of the newly passed U.S. federal 
health reform law.6  In fact, Francis Collins, the director of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, calls the support for comparative effec-
tiveness research embedded in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act its “most significant” component,7 and CER has been touted 
as the new “headwind for the health-care industry” due to its ability to 
discern which drugs, treatments, and devices work best.8 
Comparative effectiveness research already plays an important 
role in the health care systems of many industrialized nations, includ-
ing those of the United Kingdom,9 France,10 Germany,11 and Austral-
 
 6 Mark McClellan, Dir., Brookings Inst. Engleberg Ctr. for Health Care Reform, Welcome 
Address at the Brookings Institution Event:  Implementing Comparative Effectiveness Re-
search:  Priorities, Methods, and Impact 6 (June 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0609_health_care_cer/2009060
9_health_care_cer.pdf [hereinafter Brookings Institution, Implementing Comparative Ef-
fectiveness]; see Rachel Saslow, NIH Director Sees Hits and Misses in Health Care, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 24, 2010, at A15 (describing an interview with the Director of the National Institutes 
of Health in which he states that the “most significant” aspect of the new health care bill 
is the inclusion of comparative effectiveness research); see also Alex Nussbaum & Meg Tir-
rell, Health Care Bill’s Small Detail to Have Big Outcome:  $500M Institute to Increase Scrutiny of 
Drug Studies, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 28, 2010, at B1 (noting that despite being 
tucked into page 1,617 of the new 2,400 page health care law and sparking minimal de-
bate, the section on comparative effectiveness research is perhaps “the most sweeping 
change to health care in 45 years”).  The article also indicated that comparative effective-
ness research would be used to help “pry savings from the [health care] system.”  Id. 
 7 Saslow, supra note 6, at A15. 
 8 Nussbaum & Tirell, supra note 6, at B1. 
 9 In the United Kingdom, for instance, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excel-
lence (NICE), which is an independent committee of health professionals, academics, 
industry and lay representatives, has been established.  KALIPSO CHALKIDOU, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVE REVIEW WITHIN THE U.K.’S NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH AND CLINICAL EXPERIENCE 1–2 (2009), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009/
Jul/Chalkidou/1296_Chalkidou_UK_CER_issue_brief_717.pdf (discussing the composi-
tion of NICE).  NICE was originally created to “reduce[] unwarranted variation in medi-
cal practice,” facilitate quick “diffusion of high-value new technologies,” and ensure that 
taxpayers’ funds were invested so as to maximize health benefit.   Id. at 1.  “NICE commit-
tees consider comparative clinical and . . . social values . . . and U.K. and European Union 
legislation when making their decisions.”  CHALKIDOU, supra at 2.  England recently de-
cided to stop considering costs in these decisions.  See Ed Silverman, UK’s NICE Loses 
Decision-Making Powers, PHARMALOT, (Nov. 2, 2010, 7:36 AM) 
http://www.pharmalot.com/2010/11/uks-niceloses-decision-making-powers.  A variety of 
mechanisms have been undertaken by the U.K. government to ensure compliance with 
NICE-issued guidelines.  See id. at 2 (“Local purchasers of care . . . are required to fund 
newly recommended technologies and hospitals to make them available when requested 
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ia.12  Some CER studies have been undertaken in the United States.13  
In fact, the state of Oregon has been successfully using CER to pri-
 
by a patient and his or her physician; compliance is increasingly considered as part of 
provider accreditation, and a new NHS Constitution makes access to NICE-recommended 
treatments a right for everyone in England.”). 
 10 France created the National Authority for Health (Haute Autorité de Santé, or HAS) in 
2005 “with the goals of optimizing the basket of reimbursable goods and services and 
helping health care professionals continuously improve their clinical practice by defining 
best-care standards and identifying relevant tools and methods.”  LISE ROCHAIX & 
BERTRAND XERRI, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, NATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH:  
FRANCE 1 (2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/
Issue%20Brief/2009/Jul/Chalkidou/1295_Rochaix_CER_France_issue_brief_724.pdf.  
HAS is an independent public authority with financial independence and a “unique legal 
identity.”  Id. at 1. 
 11 Germany evaluates comparative effectiveness research through its Institute for Quality 
and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG).  See MONA NASSER & PETER SAWICKI, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, INSTITUTE FOR QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE:  
GERMANY, 1 (2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/
Issue%20Brief/2009/Jul/Chalkidou/1294_Nasser_CER_Germany_issue_brief_724.pdf 
(providing background on IQWiG).  The majority of Germans obtain health coverage via 
the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system of sickness funds.  Id. at 1.  Decisions regard-
ing coverage under this system are made by a Federal Joint Committee, which is com-
prised of a provider, insurer, and patient representatives.  Id. at 2.  Established in 2004, 
IQWiG functions in an advisory role to review available evidence and develop recom-
mendations regarding the costs and benefits of various health services.  Id. at 2.  IQWiG 
has created processes to allow “public and stakeholder comment” on its “preliminary re-
ports.”  Id. at 6.  While the involvement of these participants furthers the transparency of 
the process, it has also caused “debate, criticisms, and discussion,” and has resulted in 
substantial media attention focusing on these reports.  Id. at 8.  These recommendations 
are reviewed by the German Joint Commission, which issues coverage and payment direc-
tives.  See id. at 1 (affording an explanation of the role of Germany’s Federal Joint Com-
mittee).  Since German law requires insurance funds to cover medically necessary servic-
es, “cost-effectiveness analysis can only be used to exclude a treatment from coverage if at 
least one equivalent alternative exists.”  Id. at 2. 
 12 In Australia, the majority of “prescriptions drugs are subsidized through the Pharmaceut-
ical Benefits Scheme (PBS).”  RUTH LOPERT, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, EVIDENCE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING WITHIN AUSTRALIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME 1 
(2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20
Brief/2009/Jul/Chalkidou/1297_Lopert_CER_Australia_issue_brief_724.pdf.  Drugs are 
recommended for inclusion on this list by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Commit-
tee (PBAC), an independent statutory committee, which considers both the comparative 
effectiveness and the comparative cost-effectiveness of the drugs it reviews.  Id. at 1–2.  
Despite cost-effectiveness considerations, the PBS processes are not considered a cost-
containment mechanism but rather a way to ensure the best value for Australian taxpay-
ers’ money and equal access to affordable prescription drugs.  Id. at 3.  The PBS main-
tains significant public support, despite some controversial decisions.  Id. at 9. 
 13 See Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild Card:  The Uncertain Effectiveness of Compara-
tive Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (noting that some gov-
ernment agencies, such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, have pre-
viously provided support for CER activities, and that some private entities, including 
health insurance companies and drug and device companies, have also previously under-
taken CER studies). 
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oritize services for its Medicaid recipients since the mid-1990s.14  Yet 
the potentially substantial benefits of widespread use of CER have on-
ly recently begun to garner significant attention in the United 
States.15 
The current buzz in the U.S. media over comparative effectiveness 
research perhaps began in earnest on February 17, 2009, when CER 
was thrust to center stage as President Obama signed into law the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), “a na-
tionwide effort to . . . transform our economy to compete in the 21st 
century.”16  The Act included provisions creating jobs and providing 
relief to working-and middle-class families.17  Perhaps less well known, 
it also set aside a substantial grant of $1.1 billion for comparative ef-
fectiveness research.18 
Following on the heels of the ARRA, Americans saw the enact-
ment of health care reform on March 23, 2010.  The Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provides additional support 
for CER by establishing a new non-governmental organization, the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, whose primary pur-
 
 14 See Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-Effectiveness Research—The Oregon Expe-
rience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18(1) (2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/
NEJMp0912938. 
 15 See Conway & Clancy, supra note 3, at 985 (“The concept of CE research is not 
new . . . [w]hat is new is the recognition of and substantial public support for research 
that is essential for delivering care that is consistently patient centered and an important 
accelerator for achieving the promise of personalized medicine.”); James M. Stube-
nrauch, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  It Could Change the Way Health Care Decisions Are 
Made,  AM. J. NURSING, Oct. 2009, at 26, 27 (relaying a quote by the director of the Na-
tional Institute for Nursing Research that “[c]omparative effectiveness research has gar-
nered increased attention as an area of science that can have a significant impact upon 
the future health care of the American people” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 16 The White House, The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act:  Jumpstarting Our 
Economy and Investing in Our Future (Feb. 17, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/assetts/
documents/Recovery_Act_Overview_2-17.pdf.  
 17 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (providing appropriations to reinvigorate the American economy). 
 18 See Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, AHRQ and the Recovery Act, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (June 2010), http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/
cefarra.htm (elaborating on the funding provided to AHRQ through the ARRA for com-
parative effectiveness research); see also FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 11 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/cerannualrpt.pdf (“The ARRA fund-
ing reflects the heightened interest in CER among the nation’s clinicians, patients, policy 
makers and researchers and broader recognition of its potential to improve outcomes 
that matter to patients, including morbidity, mortality, and quality of life.”). 
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pose is to facilitate comparative effectiveness research.19  These suc-
cessive, massive grants of federal dollars for CER raise the question, 
“What is comparative effectiveness research, and why is the govern-
ment pouring so much money into it?” 
A. What Is Comparative Effectiveness Research? 
The definition of CER continues to evolve.  Thus, different 
sources offer slightly varying definitions of what comparative effec-
tiveness research encompasses.  After the enactment of the ARRA, 
two different entities—the Federal Coordinating Council for Com-
parative Effectiveness Research and the Institute of Medicine—were 
charged with creating priorities for comparative effectiveness re-
search.20  Each entity proposed its own definitions of comparative ef-
fectiveness research.21 
In its report to the President and Congress, the Federal Coordi-
nating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research defines com-
parative effectiveness research as follows: 
Comparative effectiveness research is the conduct and synthesis of re-
search comparing the benefits and harms of different interventions and 
strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor health conditions in 
“real world” settings.  The purpose of this research is to improve health 
outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based information 
to patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to their 
expressed needs, about which interventions are most effective for which 
patients under specific circumstances.   
 To provide this information, comparative effectiveness research 
must assess a comprehensive array of health-related outcomes for 
diverse patient populations and subgroups.   
 Defined interventions compared may include medications, pro-
cedures, medical and assistive devices and technologies, diagnos-
tic testing, behavioral change, and delivery system strategies.   
 
 19 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 727 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e) (indicating provisions for 
comparative effectiveness research and establishing the Institute). 
 20 See Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research Membership:  Recovery Act 
Allocates $1.1 Billion for Comparative Effectiveness Research, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/os/cerbios.html (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2011); see also John K. Iglehart, Prioritizing Comparative-Effectiveness Research—IOM 
Recommendations, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325, 325 (2009) (explaining the role of the Insti-
tute of Medicine in prioritizing federal goals for CER research). 
 21 See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
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 This research necessitates the development, expansion, and use of 
a variety of data sources and methods to assess comparative effec-
tiveness and actively disseminate the results.22 
An alternative definition of comparative effective research has been 
proposed by the Institute of Medicine (IOM).  According to the IOM, 
CER is the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the bene-
fits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and 
monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care.  The pur-
pose of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy 
makers to make informed decisions that will improve health care at both 
the individual and population levels.23 
The IOM notes that “CER can take many forms.”24  These forms 
can include reviews of literature, established databases such as elec-
tronic medical records, or prospective registries.  They can also in-
clude research done through cohort studies and randomized control 
trials.25 
Another important definition of CER is found in the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  The PPACA defines com-
parative effectiveness research as follows:  “The term[] ‘comparative 
clinical effectiveness research’ . . . mean[s] research evaluating and 
comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and 
benefits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items.”  These 
“medical treatments, services, and items” include: 
health care interventions, protocols for treatment, care management, 
and delivery, procedures, medical devices, diagnostic tools, pharmaceuti-
cals (include drugs and biologicals), integrative health practices, and any 
other strategies or items being used in the treatment, management, and 
diagnosis of, or prevention of illness or injury in, individuals.26 
The PPACA’s definition of CER indicates that the scope of CER 
which will be funded by the federal government is quite broad.27  The 
PPACA eliminated the Federal Coordinating Council on Compara-
tive Effectiveness, which was created by the Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act, and established a new Patient-Centered Outcomes Re-
search Institute to develop and help implement a CER project 
 
 22 FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note 18, 
at 5. 
 23 INST. OF MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 
1 (2009), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/
ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities/CER%20report%20brief%2008-13-09.pdf. 
 24 Id. at 1. 
 25 Id. at 1–2. 
 26 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119, 727 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e).  
 27 Alan M. Garber & Harold C. Sox, Analysis & Commentary:  The Role of Costs in Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, 29 Health Aff. 1805, 1805 (2010). 
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agenda.28  The Institute is charged with assisting patient, physician, 
purchaser, and policy makers in healthcare-related decisions by mak-
ing better evidence available to them through CER studies.29  The In-
stitute’s purpose is to “disseminat[e] . . . research findings with re-
spect to the relative outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and 
appropriateness of . . . medical treatments, services and items.”30 
B. Why Is the U.S. Government Interested in Utilizing Comparative 
Effectiveness Research Findings? 
The new focus on comparative effectiveness clinical research in 
the United States stems from a growing recognition that rising Amer-
ican health care costs constitute a significant challenge in the quest 
for successful health care reform.31  Proliferating health care services, 
increases in the volume and intensity of services, the provision of un-
necessary care, professional liability, advances in medical technology, 
and an aging population are just some of the reasons cited for the 
current health care cost crisis.32  While various strategies have been 
employed to reduce these costs,33 better information, obtained 
through comparative effectiveness research, regarding the costs and 
benefits of health care treatment options has more recently been 
 
 28  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6302 (terminating the Federal Coordinat-
ing Council); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301 (establishing the Patient-
Centered Outcomes Research Institute).   
 29  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301. 
 30 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a) (specifying the purpose of the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute). 
 31 See Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, Affordability Is Major Challenge for Reform—Burden 
on Middle Class Is a Top Concern, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2009, at A1 (“Democrats and Re-
publicans alike worry that a [health care] bill intended to address one source of financial 
hardship—the skyrocketing cost of health care—could lead to another, in the form of 
hefty premiums.”); Karen Davis, Why Health Reform Must Counter the Rising Costs of Health 
Insurance Premiums, COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Blog/Davis_Blog_Aug
ust_09_rev.pdf (“As health reform advanced through congressional committees this 
summer, much attention was given to trimming the federal budget cost and slowing the 
growth in Medicare outlays. . . . Health system reform will be effective only if the legisla-
tion considers the financial well-being of all participants, not just that of the federal gov-
ernment.”). 
 32 See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be Changed to Ac-
commodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1809, 1819–24 (1992) 
(discussing factors which may contribute to escalating health care costs). 
 33 See William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 160 (discussing market responses to rising health care costs). 
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touted as the key to reducing health care spending without adversely 
impacting the quality of health care provided in the United States.34 
In light of the belief that CER can help to reduce health care 
spending, references to cost-effectiveness are noticeably absent from 
the PPACA’s CER definition.  Cost-effectiveness analysis is a compo-
nent of CER in some other countries.35  However, largely due to fears 
of rationing, cost-effectiveness analysis as a component of CER in the 
United States is limited in the PPACA.36 
Cost-effectiveness, which has been defined as “a method . . . to as-
sess the comparative impacts of expenditures on different health in-
terventions,” is actually frequently conflated with CER.37   
[P]eople confuse cost-effectiveness analysis with [CER] because the de-
nominator of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is often derived di-
rectly from the results of a study of . . . comparative effectiveness.  If the 
 
 34 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 1–2 (discussing how comparative effectiveness 
research may enable our health care system to save money without compromising the 
quality of care); Tobias Loddenkemper et al., Fears and Promises of Comparative Effectiveness 
Research, 99 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 1311, 1312 (2010) (“CER . . . suggests opportunities for re-
duced spending when it identifies what is inefficient or ineffective.  An additional benefit 
would be the avoidance of adverse side effects of unneeded tests and therapies, and the 
reduced occurrence of false positive results and their consequences.”); see also Ellen-Marie 
Whelan & Sonia Sekhar, Better Health Through Better Information:  Comparative Effectiveness 
Research Will Help Deliver Better Medical Care, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 29, 2009), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/09/cer_brief.html (explaining how 
comparative effectiveness could improve the current American health care system, in 
which “[i]t’s estimated that one-third of procedures and treatments administered in the 
United States have no proven benefit and account for up to $700 billion annually in cur-
rent spending.  Moreover, some of these treatments can have harmful side effects, pro-
duce worse health outcomes, and then, as a result, add to the soaring costs of medical 
care”). 
 35 See Research Insights:  Incorporating Costs into Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
ACADEMYHEALTH (Feb. 2009), www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/research
insightscer.pdf (noting a study showing ten industrialized countries explicitly include cost 
in CER evaluations).  However, England recently decided to stop considering costs in its 
healthcare decisions.  See Ed Silverman, UK’s NICE Loses Decision-Making Powers, 
PHARMALOT (Nov. 2, 2010, 7:36 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2010/11/uks-nice-
loses-decision-making-powers.  
 36 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat 119, 741 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1) (“The Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute . . . shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality ad-
justed life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an indi-
vidual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or 
recommended.  The Secretary shall not utilize such an adjusted life year (or such a simi-
lar measure) as a threshold to determine coverage, reimbursement, or incentive pro-
grams under title XVIII.”). 
 37 See Garber & Sox, supra note 27, at 1808 (quoting A.M. Garber et al., Theoretical Founda-
tions of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE (Marthe 
R. Gold et al. eds. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining cost-effectiveness 
according to the Federal Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine). 
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study outcomes and the analysis are expressed in the same units, . . . the 
two quantities will ordinarily be identical.38 
The PPACA’s limitation on cost-effectiveness analyses may, at first, 
seem incongruous with the desire to use CER to improve the value of 
American health care.  However, health care experts contend that 
these diverging interests are reconciled by the fact that private par-
ties, such as health insurance companies, physician groups, and hos-
pitals, will use the federal government’s CER to conduct their own 
cost-analyses and distribute this cost information.  By funding CER 
that does not contain a cost-effectiveness component, the federal 
government can avoid the backlash that would likely stem from di-
rectly financing cost-effectiveness analysis while simultaneously facili-
tating such analyses.39 
A variety of factors suggest that the U.S. government is likely to 
seek some way to utilize comparative effectiveness research to bend 
the health care cost curve.  First and foremost, the fact that substan-
tial savings could be generated by using such information was recent-
ly acknowledged by Peter Orszag,40 the former head of the Congres-
sional Budget Office and a key player in the passage of Obama’s 
health reform plan.41  Other health care and economics experts are 
also beginning to tout the manner in which comparative effectiveness 
research could help the government achieve savings in publicly 
funded health care programs.42  Furthermore, many other major 
world powers have already acknowledged the benefits of CER and in-
tegrated such research into their health care systems, suggesting that 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 1810; see also Robert Wood Johnson Found., Health Policy Brief, Updated:  Com-
parative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF., http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicy
briefs/brief.php?brief_id=28 (describing how the government and the Patient-Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute cannot use a cost-effectiveness measure as a “threshold” for 
establishing coverage of health care treatment options, but researchers undertaking fed-
erally funded CER can incorporate a cost-effectiveness component in their analysis). 
 40 Robert Wood Johnson Found., supra note 39 (acknowledging that comparative effective-
ness research could generate tremendous savings for our health care system). 
 41 See Key Players:  Health Care Reform, PBS NEWSHOUR, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/health/jan-june09/healthprofiles_06-08.html (listing the critical players in the 
health reform debates); see also Michael D. Shear & Ed O’Keefe, Orszag to Resign as White 
House Budget Director, Source Says, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A4 (indicating that Orszag 
announced his resignation from the Office of Management and Budget in June 2010). 
 42 See Steven D. Pearson & Peter B. Bach, How Medicare Could Use Comparative Effectiveness 
Research in Deciding on New Coverage and Reimbursement, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1796, 1797 (2010) 
(noting that “comparative effectiveness research may be able to play a role in Medicare, 
particularly if a clear vision can be developed for the program’s use of research data to 
help contain costs without restricting access to services”). 
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the United States is lagging behind the times on this issue.43  Finally, 
there is growing recognition that health care in the United States is 
rationed even when no decision is explicitly made to do so.  The sug-
gestion has been put forth that allowing the government to ration 
care directly might be more beneficial to the general U.S. population 
than allowing indirect rationing to continue.44 
C. Political Opposition to Comparative Effectiveness Research 
History has shown that federal “agencies whose central mission is 
research on such practical matters as the cost, quality, use and out-
comes of health services perennially struggle” in U.S. politics to find 
support.45  Since CER seeks to achieve similar goals, it is perhaps not 
surprising that certain factions have been strongly opposed to provid-
ing federal support for such research.  Some sectors of the health 
care industry, for instance, “fear that a truly efficient and effective 
healthcare system would cripple their profit margins.”46  Other CER 
opponents contend that it will create government interference in the 
doctor-patient relationship and fail to account for individual patient 
 
 43 See sources cited supra notes 9–12 (indicating that countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and Australia have all incorporated comparative effectiveness research 
into their health care decision making). 
 44 See Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at MM38 (dis-
cussing how health care is rationed even when no explicit decision is made to do so); see 
also Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe:  The Impact of the Federal Age Dis-
crimination Act on the “Hidden” Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 1004–11 
(1988) (providing further background on health care rationing). 
 45 See Bradford H. Gray et al., AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services Research, 
HEALTH AFF. 2 (June 23, 2003), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/
early/2003/06/25/hlthaff.w3.283.full.pdf. 
 46 See Joe Flower, Fear and Loathing over the Stimulus Bill, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://www.thehealthcareblog.com/the_health_care_blog/2009/02/fear-and-loathing-
over-the-stimulus-bill.html#more (discussing apprehensions about funding provided for 
comparative effectiveness research in President Obama’s stimulus bill); Sarah Rubens-
tein, PhRMA Tries to Keep ‘Comparative Effectiveness’ in Check, WSJ HEALTH BLOG (May 20, 
2009, 10:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/05/20/phrma-tries-to-keep-
comparative-effectiveness-in-check/tab/article/ (discussing methods by which the drug 
industry has been pushing back against the use of comparative effectiveness research); see 
also Jerry Avorn, Debate About Funding Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW. ENG. J. 
MED. 1927, 1928 (2009) (“The problem is that comparative studies will be threatening to 
makers and sellers of costly goods and services that offer no benefit over existing alterna-
tives.”); Coverage & Access:  Supporters, Opponents of Comparative Effectiveness Research ‘Gearing 
Up’ To Clash over Planned Efforts, New York Times Reports, KAISERNETWORK.ORG (May 7, 
2009), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=58368 (indi-
cating that certain health care stakeholders expressed concerns over the inclusion of 
funding in President Obama’s stimulus bill for comparative effectiveness research). 
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differences in medical decision making.47  Some argue that treatment 
guidelines could be impacted by “corruption and abuse” and that 
these guidelines might be unable to keep pace with medical innova-
tion.48 
Whether the new health reform legislation should include sup-
port for comparative effectiveness research was a “fierce debate” in 
Congress in the summer of 2009, when rumors were rampant that 
comparative effectiveness research would lead to government ration-
ing of health care and “death panels.”49  During the 2009 legislative 
session, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Act was introduced 
in the Senate but ultimately did not pass, largely as a result of these 
various stakeholder concerns.50  Other attempts have also been made 
 
 47 See Iglehart, supra note 20, at 327 (enumerating concerns that some health care stake-
holders have regarding the use of comparative effectiveness research); Loddenkemper, 
supra note 34, at 1312 (discussing concerns about physicians becoming “gatekeepers” of 
health care access and about rationing of care, delays in treatment, and a reduction in 
available treatment options); see also JEFFREY BERNSTEIN, U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH 
GRP., THE FACTS ABOUT COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.uspirg.org/home/reports/report-archives/health-care/health-care/the-facts-
about-comparative-effectiveness-research (noting that comparative effectiveness research 
has recently emerged in the health care reform debate as an area of controversy); Tony 
Coelho, A Patient Advocate’s Perspective on Patient-Centered Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 1885, 1888 (2010) (discussing how “many Americans still misinterpret 
the intent of [comparative effectiveness] research”); Stubenrauch, supra note 15, at 27 
(“Despite the clear need for CER and its obvious benefits, it has recently become a matter 
of heated debate within the struggle over health care reform.  Just as some opponents of 
current reform plans have misrepresented a proposal to fund optional end-of-life coun-
seling for Medicare patients as ‘death panels’ that would ‘pull the plug on Grandma,’ 
they have also tried to raise fears that CER could be used to deny specific treatments to 
deserving patients and to ‘ration’ health care.”); Whelan & Sekhar, supra note 34 (“Com-
parative effectiveness research is now under fire despite its critical importance as objec-
tive research.  Critics worry about the government’s role in determining best practices.  
They assert that the government will use the findings to intrude on patient-provider rela-
tionships.  They worry that the research will not account for variations in patient health 
statuses and backgrounds.  And they are concerned that the findings will be used to make 
coverage determinations.”). 
 48 Alan S. Gerber et al., A National Survey Reveals Public Skepticism About Research-Based Treat-
ment Guidelines, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1882, 1882–83 (2010). 
 49 Susan Dentzer, Comparative Effectiveness:  Coherent Health Care at Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 
1756, 1756 (2010).  For a more analytical view of the potential harms of Medicare using 
comparative effectiveness research to guide its reimbursement decisions, see Anirban Ba-
su & Tomas J. Philipson, The Impact of Comparative Effectiveness Research on Health and Health 
Care Spending (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15633, 2010), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15633 (“The main conclusion of our analysis is that 
simplistic thinking about the impact of traditionally perceived CER may have adverse ef-
fects.”). 
 50 See Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Act of 2009, S. 1213, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); See generally Paul Keckley & Barbara B. Frink, Comparative Effectiveness:  A Strategic 
Perspective on What It Is and What It May Mean for the United States, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCIS. 
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to prevent the government from funding comparative effectiveness 
research,51 though these efforts have received little attention in the 
media.52  Ultimately, support for comparative effectiveness research 
was incorporated into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, but the initiative is said to have been “so controversial . . . that it 
spent weeks in surgery before materializing in the final reform pack-
age.”53 
While CER has already “dodged a barrage of well-coordinated bul-
lets[,] . . . the debate is bound to continue.”54  Comparative effective-
ness research is potentially poised to play a tremendous role in health 
reform with respect to “bending the health care cost curve.”55  How-
ever, if its use is significantly obstructed by opponents, the ability of 
health care reform to succeed could be severely undermined.56 
The U.S. government could choose to harness comparative effec-
tiveness research findings in a variety of ways.  The government could 
use CER findings to ban outright all U.S. citizens from accessing cer-
tain treatment options.  Alternatively, the government could use CER 
results to ban a certain classification of individuals, such as a specific 
racial group or gender, from accessing a given treatment option.  
 
L. 53 (2009) (describing why some stakeholders oppose the use of comparative effective-
ness research). 
 51 See Avorn, supra note 46, at 1927 (“The proposal to include $1.1 billion for comparative-
effectiveness research (CER) in the federal stimulus package encountered a vigorous and 
well-coordinated backlash.  The campaign to gut this funding ultimately failed, but the 
debate it engendered and the resonance of the opposition’s arguments in both lay and 
policy circles reveal much about the issues that will surround such research and its appli-
cation in the coming years.”). 
 52 See Bob Moffit & Julius Chen, Senate Committee Blocks Anti-Rationing Amendments, FOUNDRY:  
CONSERVATIVE POL’Y NEWS (July 10, 2009), http://blog.heritage.org/2009/07/10/
senate-committee-blocks-anti-rationing-amendments/ (highlighting that the media has 
largely ignored attempts to block funding for comparative effectiveness research). 
 53 Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1757. 
 54 Avorn, supra note 46, at 1929; see also Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1760 (“[T]he debate over 
the role of comparative effectiveness research in US health care is clearly far from over.”). 
 55 See Brookings Institution, Implementing Comparative Effectiveness, supra note 6, at 6. 
 56 See Consensus Statement on the Critical Importance of Comparative Effectiveness Research, PAC. 
BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.pbgh.org/news/pubs/
documents/CER-StatementtoSenate.pdf (providing a public consensus statement on be-
half of forty-four organizations representing business, labor, consumers, researchers, 
health plans, physicians, nurses, and other providers that “comparative effectiveness re-
search [is] a critical component of health reform” and should be “retained in any reform 
legislation”); see also Mark McClellan & Joshua Benner, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  
Will It Bend the Health Care Cost Curve and Improve Quality?, in IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH:  PRIORITIES, METHODS, AND IMPACT 7, 14 (2009) (indicating 
that implementing CER properly may “be challenging, but doing so could enable CER to 
play an essential role in achieving the goal of bending the cost curve while improving 
health in America”). 
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The government could also use CER findings to alter procedural re-
quirements so as to render more difficult obtaining a treatment op-
tion that has been deemed less desirable on the basis of CER results.  
The government could also deny public funding for certain medical 
treatment options on the basis of CER findings. 
In the near future, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services is likely to resort to at least some of these means of banning 
or limiting access to health care treatment options on the basis of 
CER results in order to rein in escalating health care costs.57  Legal 
commentators believe that such government rationing of health care 
will raise constitutional challenges.58 
Thus, Parts II through IV of this Comment explore whether each 
of these potential ways in which the U.S. government may seek to use 
comparative effectiveness research findings to ban or limit access to 
health treatment options would withstand constitutional challenge.  
Part VI considers the relevant procedural due process concerns 
raised when the government deprives an individual of a health care 
treatment option without adequate procedural protections.  Finally, 
Part VII explores whether the government could constitutionally use 
certificate-of-need standards or licensing requirements to restrict 
health care investments by private actors on the basis of CER find-
ings.  Ultimately, this Comment affords an in-depth assessment of po-
tential constitutional hurdles to a national health care system that 
harnesses comparative effectiveness research findings to ban or limit 
access to certain health care treatment options.  In light of the major 
investments and support provided for CER in recent federal legisla-
 
 57 Health care experts already emphatically advocate for a cost-effectiveness component to 
be incorporated into the government’s CER research.  See, e.g., Garber & Sox, supra note 
27, at 1809 (“[T]he Patient-Center Outcomes Research Institute and other sponsors of 
the research should demand that it include data on use and costs, for several reasons.”); 
see also Pearson & Bach, supra note 42, at 1797  (“[T]he best way for Medicare to benefit 
from the nation’s new investment in comparative effectiveness research is to use it as a 
bridge—a conceptual and practical tool to link positive coverage decisions with evidence-
based reimbursement levels.”).  Note that constitutional challenges to PPACA have al-
ready occurred.  See, for instance, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-
cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  However, at the time this 
Comment went to press, the challenges had only focused on the act’s mandate to pur-
chase health care coverage and not the use of CER results. 
 58 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 239, 285–86 (surmising that constitutional challenges would likely be raised if ex-
pensive lifesaving medical treatments were rationed by the government); see also Kelli D. 
Back, Rationing Health Care:  Naturally Unjust?, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 245, 255 
(1991) (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet addressed a case of explicit 
health care rationing.  Still the issue is alive,” so health care rationing may be subject to 
constitutional challenge). 
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tion and the growing emphasis on finding ways that the government 
can rely on CER findings to help reduce costs in the U.S. health care 
system,59 this issue is critically relevant to current legal debates.60 
II. COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AND THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
In 2009, a bill about using CER findings made its way through the 
House but ultimately failed to succeed in the Senate.61  However, CER 
research was later a prominent feature of the Senate’s version of 
health care reform legislation, known as the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), that was enacted into law after being 
passed by the House and signed by the President.62  A detailed look at 
the language of the PPACA, as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,63 reveals explicit language re-
garding how CER findings may be utilized by the U.S. government.64 
Section 6301(a) of the PPACA prohibits the newly established Pa-
tient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, established to develop 
and implement a CER project agenda, from mandating “coverage, 
reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer.”65  
Section 6301(a) provides that “[t]he [Department of Health and 
Human Services’] Secretary may only use evidence and findings from 
research conducted under section 1181 [of the Social Security Act as 
 
 59 See supra note 57. 
 60 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), § 6301, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 727 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e) (including provisions for com-
parative effectiveness research). 
 61 See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 1401(a) (2009) 
(specifying that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed—(A) to permit [a newly es-
tablished Comparative Effectiveness Research Commission or the Center for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research] to mandate coverage, reimbursement or other policies for any 
public or private payer; or (B) as preventing the Secretary [of the Department of Health 
and Human Services] from covering the routine costs of clinical care received” under 
Medicare, Medicaid, or via participation in a clinical trial); id. (noting that “[n]one of the 
reports submitted under this section or research findings disseminated by the Center or 
Commission shall be construed as mandates, for payment, coverage, or treatment,” or “to 
authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the 
practice of medicine”). 
 62 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-151, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 63 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., 124 Stat. 
1029. 
 64 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a) (setting forth adequate proce-
dures for using comparative effectiveness research findings to render a Medicare cover-
age determination). 
 65 Id. 
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amended] to make a determination regarding Title XVIII if such use 
is through an iterative and transparent process which includes public 
comment and considers the effect on subpopulations.”66  The legisla-
tion further specifies that CER findings should not be construed as 
permitting the Secretary to deny Medicare coverage for items or ser-
vices “solely” on the basis of such research.67  The Secretary is also 
prohibited from using such findings “in a manner that treats extend-
ing the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of 
lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, 
nondisabled, or not terminally ill.”68  However, the Secretary may util-
ize such findings when they would help extend the lives of such indi-
viduals.69 
While this newly enacted health care law specifies some limitations 
on the use of comparative effectiveness research findings, the Act 
does leave room for the Department of Health and Human Services 
to use comparative effectiveness research findings to guide its deter-
minations about Medicare coverage for certain health care treatment 
options.  The PPACA explicitly states that such changes can occur 
through “an iterative and transparent process which includes public 
comment and considers the effect on subpopulations” (and as long as 
the findings do not value extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or 
terminally ill individual less than extending the life of younger, non-
disabled or non-terminally ill individuals).70  A final rule issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services with new provisions ban-
ning or limiting access to health care treatment options on the basis 
of comparative effectiveness research findings, even if enacted 
through proper administrative procedures, could of course still be 
challenged on constitutional grounds.71  As more CER results become 
 
 66 See id.  Note that Title XVIII refers to Medicare coverage, which is public health insurance 
for the aged and disabled.  See Compilation of the Social Security Laws, Title XVIII:  
Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/
title18/1800.htm.  The PPACA does include a parallel provision for Medicaid. 
 67 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a) (specifying limitations on the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with respect to uses of com-
parative effectiveness research). 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. (specifying permissible uses of comparative effectiveness research).  It is perhaps 
interesting to note that this language only references how to value “extending” life.  The 
Act is silent with respect to how the quality of life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill 
individual should be valued when weighed against extending the life, or the quality of 
life, of an individual who is younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See, e.g., Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (holding that a Postal Service regulation prohibiting solicitation of signatures on 
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available, the government may seek to utilize these findings to 
achieve health care savings.72  The next sections of this Comment 
contemplate the ways in which the U.S. government could attempt to 
use new comparative effectiveness research findings to impact access 
to health care treatment options.  This Comment will also consider 
whether those intended uses could withstand constitutional chal-
lenge. 
 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT BANS ON 
MEDICAL TREATMENT OPTIONS 
The U.S. government has the capacity to use comparative effec-
tiveness research findings directly in a number of ways.  One conceiv-
able way is to impose an absolute ban on access to a certain medical 
treatment option.73  Such a scenario could unfold if CER results show 
a particular medical treatment option is substantially better than a 
competing treatment option.  For instance, CER findings could re-
veal that Drug A, which is used to treat leukemia, has markedly better 
patient outcomes and fewer side effects than Drug B, a competitor.  
While both drugs may be approved by the FDA, the Department of 
Health and Human Services could, on the basis of these CER find-
ings, promulgate a rule which would ban all Americans from access-
ing Drug B.  Would such an absolute government ban withstand con-
stitutional challenge? 
In order to assess the constitutionality of the government denying 
access to certain health care treatment options, the substantive as-
pects of the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments must be considered.74  The U.S. Constitution grants and 
restricts government power, but does not directly control the activi-
 
petitions, pools, or surveys on Postal Service property violated the free speech guarantees 
of the First Amendment). 
 72 See supra note 57. 
 73 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the Glucksberg test for establishing a funda-
mental right), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
156 (2007) (upholding regulations prohibiting a certain procedure for a partial-birth 
abortion). 
 74 See Kevin Cole, Federal and State “State Action”:  The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized 
Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 330 (1990) (elaborating on the relationship between consti-
tutional challenges and “state action” required to invoke constitutional protections of the 
Due Process Clause). 
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ties of private individuals or organizations.75  Thus, a constitutional 
claim cannot stand unless the alleged harm stems from government 
wrongdoing.76  The state action inquiry occurs before the merits of 
the constitutional claim are considered.77 
In this inquiry, courts will examine the specific conduct about 
which the plaintiff is complaining and whether the decision making 
regarding that conduct implicates the government in any way.78  
Where the government makes a decision to deny an individual access 
to a certain health care treatment option, the state action doctrine 
would clearly be implicated.79  The next stage of constitutional analy-
sis would proceed differently depending on the type of medical 
treatment option at issue.80  In order to explore these differences 
more clearly, the next portion of analysis will focus on the following 
two common medical treatment options and the constitutional impli-
cations of denying access to each of them:  new drugs and medical 
procedures. 
A. Absolute Bans on Drugs 
A constitutional challenge could be brought if the U.S. govern-
ment imposes an absolute ban on certain drugs.  This section ex-
plains why a constitutional challenge a ban on a drug not yet ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration is unlikely to succeed.  
It also describes why a constitutional challenge to an absolute ban on 
a drug approved by the FDA could be more successful. 
 
 75 See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
387, 388 (2003) (noting that “with respect to its individual rights provisions, the Constitu-
tion binds only governmental actors and not private individuals”). 
 76 See Cole, supra note 74, at 327 (“Purely ‘private’ action cannot violate these provisions.”). 
 77 See John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV. 569, 
578 (2005) (“[T]he state action inquiry occurs prior to, and separate from, the merits of a 
constitutional claim.”). 
 78 See id. at 577–78 (explaining the basic structure of state action analysis). 
 79 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing when the state action doctrine is 
implicated). 
 80 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1753, 1753 (1996) (“Before a new therapeutic drug or medical device can be com-
mercialized in the United States, it must meet the safety and effectiveness requirements 
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”); cf. David A. Grimes, Commentary, Tech-
nology Follies:  The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030, 3032 (1993) 
(“A double standard in tests and treatments prevails.  While new medicines must have ri-
gorous proof of efficacy and safety before clinical use, tests and operations do not.”). 
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The modern day Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was enacted in 
1938,81 giving rise to our current system of Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) premarket approval for new drugs that enter the U.S. 
marketplace.82  While the Act initially only allowed the FDA to estab-
lish that new drugs were safe, the 1962 amendments to the Act led to 
the current requirement that new drugs be found not only safe but 
also effective in order to be approved by the FDA and permitted to 
enter the market.83  Thus, presently, the U.S. government has the 
power to forbid individuals from obtaining drugs which do not meet 
necessary safety and efficacy standards. 
Cases such as Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 
v. von Eschenbach have tested the constitutionality of forbidding access 
to new drugs that have not yet met all of the FDA’s safety and efficacy 
standards for market approval.84  In Abigail Alliance, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia applied the test outlined in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg85 to determine whether terminally ill patients have 
a fundamental right to access experimental drugs that have com-
pleted Phase I clinical testing for safety but have not yet been eva-
luated for effectiveness.86  The court first determined that such a right 
could not be considered fundamental, as our nation’s history demon-
 
 81 See Merrill, supra note 80, at 1761 (noting that the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
was passed after the “Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster” resulted in more than one hundred 
Tennessee residents being poisoned by a recklessly produced new drug (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 82 See id. at 1762 (“This was the beginning of the modern system of premarket approval 
which now covers practically all drugs . . . .”). 
 83 See id. at 1765 (“[T]he Amendments . . . raised the standard that a new drug had to satisfy 
by explicitly directing FDA to confirm its effectiveness as well as its safety.”); see also 
Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medi-
cal Devices:  Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 890–
914 (1996) (providing an overview of modern regulation of drugs by the FDA). 
 84 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the test from Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997), for determining whether a right is fundamental), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1159 (2008). 
 85 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (establishing that, in order for 
a right to be protected by the Due Process Clause, the right must be a fundamental right 
or liberty that is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed,’” and that a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty in-
terest” must be provided (citations omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325, 326 (1937))). 
 86 See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 699 (discussing how Abigail Alliance requested that the 
FDA promulgate new regulations to permit the marketing of experimental drugs in cer-
tain circumstances after Phase I trials were completed). 
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strates increasing regulation of drugs.87  Furthermore, the court de-
termined that the country’s legal traditions of allowing a necessity de-
fense, prohibiting intentional interference with rescue, and recogniz-
ing a right of self-defense did not justify creating a constitutional 
right for an individual to assume any level of risk with respect to the 
drugs they ingest.88  Since the right of access to experimental drugs 
was ultimately not deemed fundamental, government restrictions on 
access to these drugs were subject to mere rational basis review.89  The 
court held that the “FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational 
drugs” that have only completed Phase I testing was “rationally re-
lated to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including 
the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown thera-
peutic effects.”90  The Supreme Court declined certiorari.91 
This case reveals that the FDA can constitutionally ban access to 
drugs that it has not yet approved.  This holding is also supported by 
United States. v. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, in which the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California determined that the pa-
tients did not have a fundamental right of access to a different drug, 
medical marijuana.92  The court opinion cited to Carnohan v. United 
States93 and Rutherford v. United States,94 both of which rejected claims 
that individuals had substantive due process rights to a drug believed 
to treat cancer, but unapproved by the FDA.95 
 
 87 See id. at 707 (“[C]reating constitutional rights to be free from regulation based solely 
upon a prior lack of regulation would undermine much of the modern administrative 
state, which, like drug regulation, has increased in scope as changing conditions have 
warranted.”). 
 88 See id. at 707–10 (discussing why Alliance’s arguments fail to establish the requested right 
as fundamental). 
 89 See id. at 712 (“Because the Alliance’s claimed right is not fundamental, the Alliance’s 
claim of a right of access to experimental drugs is subject only to rational basis scrutiny.”). 
 90 Id. at 713. 
 91 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Lets Stand Experimental-Drug Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 
2008, at A2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to let stand the circuit court’s de-
termination that the terminally ill do not have a constitutional right to access experimen-
tal drugs). 
 92 See United States v. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, No. C 98-00085 CRB, 1999 WL 111893, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1999) (finding no constitutional right to access marijuana for me-
dicinal purposes). 
 93 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to find a constitutional right for the plain-
tiff to treat himself with a drug not yet approved by the FDA). 
 94 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979) (holding that patients do not have a constitutional right to 
access drugs unapproved by the FDA). 
 95 See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions:  A Tale of Two 
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 283–86 (2007) (discussing court cases involving medicinal 
marijuana). 
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The same District Court ruling in Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative 
reached the same conclusion again a few years later in Raich v. Ash-
croft.96  In Raich, the court rejected patients’ claims to medicinal mari-
juana, again finding that access to medicinal marijuana did not con-
stitute a fundamental due process right.97  This determination was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit.98 
These cases show that American courts generally do not believe 
that the Constitution provides for a fundamental right of access to a 
drug that has not been approved by the FDA, even where the patients 
requesting the drug are terminally ill.99  As a result, if the government 
decides on the basis of CER findings to impose an absolute ban on 
access to a non-FDA-approved drug, a constitutional challenge to this 
decision would likely be reviewed by courts under rational basis re-
view.  The court would likely uphold the decision.100  This review of 
the case law shows that a new drug must already be approved by the 
FDA as both safe and effective before comparative effectiveness re-
search findings could impact Americans’ access to the drug.101 
 
 96 Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act does not violate the Ninth or Tenth Amendments), rev’d on other grounds, 
352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), aff’d 
on remand, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007).  This case would later reach the Supreme Court as 
Gonzales v. Raich, where the Court addressed whether the federal Controlled Substances 
Act, which conflicted with California’s Compassionate Use Act permitting the use of me-
dicinal marijuana, fell within Congress’ commerce powers.  However, the issue of wheth-
er patients had a substantive due process right to marijuana was never considered by the 
Supreme Court; it was first raised at the district court level.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 28–29 (2005) (permitting Congress to ban the use of marijuana even where states 
have approved its use for medicinal purposes). 
 97 See Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (addressing whether access to medicinal marijuana con-
stitutes a fundamental right). 
 98 See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s de-
termination that access to medicinal marijuana does not constitute a fundamental right 
under the Constitution). 
 99 See Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due (Process):  A Case for Ex-
panded Access to Experimental Drugs Through the Political Process, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1293 
(2008) (discussing how the courts have found no fundamental right of access to experi-
mental drugs).  But see id. at 1288–90 (noting that the FDA has actually promulgated a 
Compassionate Use exemption for terminal illness, though only to access certain drugs 
undergoing Phase III trials, and has made efforts to expedite access to drugs to treat 
AIDS and other serious illnesses). 
100 See Williamson v. Lee Optical., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (“We cannot say that the 
regulation has no rational relation to that objective and therefore is beyond constitution-
al bounds.”); see also Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite:  Intermediate Scru-
tiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779 (describing how, traditionally, rational basis 
review involves substantial deference to the government). 
101 See Leibfarth, supra note 99, at 1282 (noting that new drugs must meet the FDA’s safety 
and efficacy standards before they can enter the United States marketplace). 
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As comparative effectiveness research becomes more widely avail-
able, Congress could alter the FDA’s drug approval standards so that 
it will only approve a drug to enter the marketplace when compara-
tive effectiveness research shows that it is the safest or most effective 
of an array of drugs available to treat a given medical condition.102  Al-
ternatively, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services could promulgate a rule which bans an FDA-approved drug 
that is deemed less effective or safe than a competitor on the basis of 
CER.  A constitutional challenge could be raised in either of these 
contexts.  However, since no such laws exist today, our courts have 
not previously been confronted with a similar challenge.  The out-
come of such a constitutional challenge is interesting to consider, but 
also extremely difficult to predict.  Furthermore, it seems far more 
likely that the government would seek to discourage use of FDA-
approved drugs that have been deemed less safe or effective than 
competitors on the basis of CER before they would altogether ban 
such drugs.  For these reasons, this issue remains beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
B. Absolute Bans on Medical Procedures 
In contrast to drugs—few of which ever make it to the American 
marketplace because they must be found both safe and effective by 
the FDA before Americans can access them—medical procedures are 
“subject to little formal control or regulation.”103  Medical procedures, 
such as surgical techniques, are generally only governed “by guide-
lines, promulgated by national consensus organizations, which entail 
neither enforcement nor penalty.”104  Some informal protocols are al-
so in place to help control medical procedures.  These controls con-
sist of “state licensure committees for medical practitioners, the fear 
of malpractice liability, physician profile databases, and hospital re-
view boards,” and they “are beset with significant problems.”105  Thus, 
most medical procedures could be affected by a government decision 
to ban medical procedures deemed less safe or effective than compet-
itors on the basis of CER results.  Most, but not all, government deci-
sions to ban a medical procedure would probably be reviewed by the 
 
102 Medicare and Medicaid could also deny coverage for the drug, but this section is focused 
on absolute bans of access, rather than issues of coverage. 
103 Amer S. Ahmed, Note, The Last Twist of the Knife:  Encouraging the Regulation of Innovative 
Surgical Procedures, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2005) (analyzing the disparity be-
tween administrative regulation of pharmaceuticals and surgical procedures). 
104 Id. at 1530. 
105 Id. 
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courts using a mere rational basis standard, a very low threshold, and 
upheld.106 
However, the government’s ability to deny access to certain medi-
cal procedures on the basis of comparative effectiveness research is 
not entirely unrestricted.  Medical treatment options which have 
been deemed fundamental rights by the courts cannot be easily de-
nied by the federal government, even if comparative effectiveness re-
search findings suggest that they should be denied.107  An examina-
tion of the case law pertaining to a woman’s right to an abortion 
elucidates this idea. 
A woman’s right to abortion has its roots in the 1965 Supreme 
Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court first ex-
plicitly recognized a constitutionally protected right to privacy.108  The 
Court concluded that a zone of privacy encompasses the rights speci-
fied in the Bill of Rights in order to give them full effect.109  The Su-
preme Court further pursued this linkage of privacy rights to family-
related decision making in Roe v. Wade, where the Supreme Court 
held that a woman has a fundamental right to abort her pregnancy 
for any reason, up until the “point at which the fetus becomes ‘via-
ble.’”110  The Court held that an abortion must be available when 
needed to protect a woman’s health, and rested its conclusions on 
the substantive due process provision embedded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.111  Roe’s holding supported the notion that the govern-
ment may be more limited in its ability to deny access to medical 
treatment options deemed fundamental by the courts.112  While ele-
ments of Roe, including the trimester framework, were overturned by 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Roe’s essential 
holding—that a woman has a right to an abortion during the pre-
 
106 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (“We cannot say that the reg-
ulation has no rational relation to that objective and therefore is beyond constitutional 
bounds.”); Pettinga, supra note 100, 779. 
107 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–56 (1973) (establishing a fundamental right to abor-
tion). 
108 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (establishing that “the right of pri-
vacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic” and “protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment from infringement by the States”). 
109 See id. at 485 (“The present case . . . concerns a relationship lying within the zone of pri-
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”). 
110 Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 
111 See id. at 152–56 (establishing a fundamental right to abortion). 
112 See Shannon L. Pedersen, Comment, When Congress Practices Medicine:  How Congressional 
Legislation of Medical Judgment May Infringe a Fundamental Right, 24 TOURO L. REV. 791, 
808–09 (2008) (discussing the medical treatments that have been recognized by the 
courts as fundamental rights, including “contraceptives, abortion, and the right to refuse 
medical treatment”). 
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viability portion of her pregnancy—was upheld in Casey.113  Thus, Ca-
sey left intact the notion that there are limitations on the govern-
ment’s ability to deny access to medical treatment options deemed 
fundamental by the courts. 
Government use of comparative effectiveness research to deny 
access to medical procedures such as abortion would likely be viewed 
by the courts as infringing on fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution’s substantive due process protections.  Such government 
action is also likely to be subject to strict scrutiny and struck down by 
the courts.  Thus, Casey suggests that access to medical procedures 
which constitute fundamental rights could not be denied by the gov-
ernment on the basis of comparative effectiveness research findings. 
However, the courts may allow the government to prohibit certain 
means of achieving these fundamental rights, as demonstrated by Gon-
zales v. Carhart.114  While the Carhart Court acknowledged that “a 
woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viabil-
ity and to obtain it without undue interference from the State,” the 
Court viewed the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act at issue in the case as 
“[r]egulations which do no more than create structural mechanisms 
by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the life of 
the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”115  Since the Act did not 
prohibit the standard dilation and extraction form of abortion, once 
the Act was implemented, women would still have some means by 
which to obtain a partial-birth abortion; only the intact dilation and 
extraction form of partial-birth abortions was prohibited.116  Since 
women still had access to some procedure that would help protect 
their fundamental right to an abortion, the Court, despite applying a 
 
113 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Laura J. Tepich, Note, 
Gonzales v. Carhart:  The Partial Termination of the Right to Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 
362 (2008) (providing background on the development of a woman’s right to an abor-
tion in the United States); see generally Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”:  Pregnant 
Women’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
145 (2010) (describing the evolution of a woman’s right to an abortion in the United 
States). 
114 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–66 (2007) (upholding a statute that permitted 
one form of partial-birth abortion procedures, intact dilation and extraction, but not 
another form of partial-birth abortion procedures, known as standard dilation and ex-
traction). 
115 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145–46 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 846, 877 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 154 (“[I]nterpreting the Act so that it does not prohibit standard 
[dilation and extraction] is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its 
terms.”). 
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heightened form of scrutiny, did not view the Act as an “undue bur-
den from any overbreadth” on women seeking an abortion.117 
Generally, individual rights deemed fundamental under the Con-
stitution receive extra protection in the courts in the form of strict 
scrutiny review.118  Since abortions have been designated a fundamen-
tal right by the courts,119 the courts must apply a form of heightened 
scrutiny when the government attempts to interfere with this right.120  
Yet the Court’s ultimate determination in Carhart serves as a remind-
er that, while fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny,121 
there may nevertheless be limits on the protections these fundamen-
tal rights receive. 
The holding of Carhart can be extended to the comparative effec-
tiveness research context.  Carhart serves as a reminder that, in at least 
some circumstances, it is constitutionally permissible for the govern-
ment to ban a medical procedure associated with a fundamental 
right.  This conclusion, in turn, suggests that the government could 
ban, on the basis of CER findings, a certain medical procedure that 
enables an individual to exercise a fundamental right.  The courts 
may uphold the government’s decision as long as a compelling inter-
est, narrowly tailored to meet government objectives, can be shown.122  
Notably, it is difficult to imagine another medical procedure which 
the courts would deem to be a fundamental right.  Abortion proce-
dures may be sui generis among medical procedures in terms of the 
protection that they receive from the courts, meaning a ban on other 
 
117 Id. at 147; see also David L. Faigman et al., Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David 
L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al. in the Case of Gonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 69, 99 (2006) (stating “[t]he undue burden test constitutes a form of heigh-
tened judicial scrutiny” and “[t]he right to choose an abortion is a core constitutional 
right, which triggers heightened scrutiny” (capitalization in original omitted)). 
118 See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 
227, 227 (2006) (discussing how an infringement on fundamental rights triggers strict 
scrutiny analysis, which requires the government to show a compelling purpose for its ac-
tions as well as that no other, less restrictive alternative is available). 
119 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–56 (1973) (establishing a fundamental right to abor-
tion). 
120 See Winkler, supra note 118, at 227 (indicating that strict scrutiny analysis applies in the 
context of fundamental rights). 
121 See Faigman et al., supra note 117, at 83 (“[T]he undue burden test remains a form of 
strict scrutiny.”). 
122 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–166 (2007) (upholding intact dilation and ex-
traction partial-birth abortion procedures but not standard dilation and extraction, an al-
ternative form of partial birth abortion procedure); see also id. at 157–61 (discussing how 
a ban on standard dilation and extraction procedures achieves legitimate governmental 
interests, including protecting both “the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” 
and unborn life (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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medical procedures would perhaps never be subject to the type of 
heightened scrutiny employed to review bans on abortion proce-
dures.  Thus, it seems that there are few, if any, constitutional barriers 
to government efforts to deny access to a medical procedure on the 
basis of CER research findings. 
 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT BANS ON MEDICAL 
TREATMENT OPTIONS ON THE BASIS OF RACE, GENDER, OR AGE 
This Comment has addressed the constitutional implications of at-
tempts by the U.S. government to use CER results to impose an abso-
lute ban on access to a certain medical treatment option.123  The next 
section of this Comment explores the constitutional effects of ban-
ning certain classifications of individuals, such as women, African-
Americans, the elderly, or those with disabilities, from accessing a 
medical treatment option on the basis of CER findings.  For instance, 
CER results might show that FDA-approved Drug A has substantially 
better patient outcomes and fewer side effects than FDA-approved 
Drug B, a competitor, for African-Americans.  However, the two 
drugs might provide similar patient outcomes and side effects among 
Caucasians.  On the basis of these CER findings, the government 
could choose to promulgate a rule banning all African-Americans 
from using Drug B while continuing to permit Caucasians to use both 
Drug A and Drug B.  State action would clearly be implicated in this 
case, since the government would be making a decision to ban a class 
of individuals from accessing a certain health care treatment op-
tion.124  Thus, the next step in this analysis involves considering the 
merits of a constitutional challenge to such a ban. 
A. Banning Treatment Options on the Basis of Race 
The Federal Coordinating Council (FCC) for Comparative Effec-
tiveness, in a 2009 report to the President and Congress outlining 
comparative effectiveness research priorities, indicated that more 
studies addressing the needs of individuals often underrepresented in 
 
123 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the Glucksberg test for establishing a funda-
mental right); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156–68 (upholding regulations prohibiting a 
certain procedure for a partial-birth abortion). 
124 See generally Cole, supra note 74 (contrasting federal and state constitutional state action 
doctrine); Gardbaum, supra note 75 (discussing applicability of individual constitutional 
rights only to state action). 
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clinical studies should be an important CER priority for the U.S. gov-
ernment.  The FCC indicated that more CER at the sub-group level 
could facilitate greater personalization of medicine.125  While the goal 
of such specialized research may be to improve treatment options for 
these sub-group populations, it is possible that this research could 
have unintended consequences.  For instance, if studies suggest that 
an FDA-approved drug is very safe and highly effective for Caucasians 
but that it is substantially less safe and effective for African-Americans, 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
could technically use this information to issue a rule which bans Afri-
can-Americans from accessing the drug.  This section considers the 
likely success of a constitutional challenge to such a ban. 
The notion of treatment options geared toward certain races first 
came to light in 2005, when the Food and Drug Administration ap-
proved a heart failure therapy drug called BiDil, which was only in-
tended for use by African-Americans.  Controversy surrounded the 
announcement; while some geneticists feared that the FDA was “us-
ing race as a crude shortcut for genetic typing,” certain prominent 
black politicians and scientists “embraced BiDil . . . as a way to redress 
years of inequality in medical treatment and outcomes.”126  However, 
evidence suggests that the drug might also work in individuals who 
are not black, and off-label prescribing to non-blacks allows the 
drug’s manufacturer to reach these other markets.127 
In the BiDil situation, the government created an overt racial clas-
sification with arguably benign effects on majority racial classifica-
tions, since the FDA technically only approved the drugs for blacks 
but other racial groups can still obtain access through off-label pre-
scribing.  This scenario seems to find a parallel in affirmative action 
cases.  The appropriate level of scrutiny in such circumstances re-
 
125 See FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note 
18, at 6  (“The priority populations specifically include, but are not limited to, racial and 
ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, children, the elderly, and patients with mul-
tiple chronic conditions.  These groups have been traditionally under-represented in 
medical research.”). 
126 Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2005, at C2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/health/24drugs.
html?_r=1&ref=bidil_drug (describing reactions to FDA’s approval of BiDil for blacks); see 
also Pamela Sankar & Jonathan Kahn, BiDil:  Race Medicine or Race Marketing?, HEALTH 
AFF., W5-455 (2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.455v1 (dis-
cussing whether the FDA’s approval of BiDil for just one race should be viewed as an ad-
vancement or a setback for blacks). 
127 See Sankar & Kahn, supra note 126, at W5-461 (discussing the ways in which BiDil’s manu-
facturer could reap the benefits of market exclusivity for several years after the drug was 
first approved for blacks by the FDA). 
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mains subject to litigation.  While some Supreme Court cases suggest 
strict scrutiny is warranted in parallel affirmative-action circums-
tances,128 others suggest more of a “strict scrutiny minus” or “strict in 
theory but not fatal in fact” standard.129  The BiDil situation can be 
distinguished from typical affirmative action cases because whites and 
other races presumably can still access the drug through off-label pre-
scribing.  Thus, they probably would not satisfy the requirements for 
standing to sue, which include “injury in fact.”130 
But consider what would happen if the BiDil scenario was adjusted 
in two ways.  Imagine, first, that African-Americans are the only classi-
fication of individuals that cannot access the drug.  Then imagine 
that African-Americans are actually prohibited from accessing the 
drug (the drug cannot be obtained via off-label prescribing).  It is 
theoretically possible that, on the basis of CER findings which suggest 
that a medical treatment is safe and effective except when used by 
African-Americans, the government could attempt to ban only Afri-
can-Americans from accessing the drug.  The government’s decision 
would most likely be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.  This 
standard requires that a regulation serve compelling governmental 
interests and be essential to those interests.  Under this standard the 
burden would shift to the government to prove that is has a compel-
ling interest and that the means of achieving this interest is narrowly 
tailored so as not to have a disadvantageous effect on a minority 
group.131  The Supreme Court, writing in Korematsu, indicated that 
“[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of 
such restrictions.”132  However, if the government is enacting such 
regulations as a means to cut down on health care costs, it seems 
extraordinarily unlikely that the courts would find this rationale suffi-
cient to constitute “[p]ressing public necessity,” since, in practice, 
disadvantaging racial classifications have nearly always been struck 
 
128 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–88 (1978) (addressing, for the 
first time, the appropriate level of scrutiny for benign racial classifications); see also Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (finding that all racial classifica-
tions, whether imposed by federal, state or local governments, are subject to strict scruti-
ny). 
129 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1989) (finding that some 
race-conscious measures might survive strict scrutiny in the affirmative action context). 
130 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (discussing the three re-
quirements of standing to sue, which include injury in fact, causation, and redressability). 
131 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”). 
132 Id. 
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down by the courts.133  Thus, it seems that strong legal safeguards are 
available to prevent the federal government from banning only cer-
tain minorities from accessing a given medical treatment option. 
B. Banning Treatment Options on the Basis of Gender 
In its report to the President and Congress, the Federal Coordi-
nating Council highlighted the need for greater representation of 
women in clinical trials in an effort to ensure that medical advance-
ments are responsive to their unique needs.134  If CER studies show 
that a given medical treatment is much safer and more effective for 
men than for women, the U.S. federal government could potentially 
seek to prohibit only women from accessing these treatments.  Such 
state action would likely be evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny 
test, whereby statutory “classifications by gender must serve important 
government objectives and be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives” in order to remain constitutionally permissible.135  
“The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the 
State.”136  The state must show an “exceedingly persuasive justification 
for [the] action.”137  The state cannot use “inherent differences” as 
grounds for a sex-based classification.138   
Judicial precedent suggests that the court will probably strike 
down a law based on differences that are mere social constructs.139  
However, the courts may be willing to uphold a law that benefits wom-
en when CER suggests that the differences are real.140  Yet it is difficult 
 
133 See Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal:  Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction 
of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) (“In every 
subsequent application of Korematsu’s “rigid scrutiny” . . . the Court has struck down 
harmful government racial classifications.  As a result, most commentators came to be-
lieve that government racial discrimination would never survive strict scrutiny again.”).  
But see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (“We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was 
made and when the petitioner violated it.”). 
134 FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note 18, 
at 17 (recognizing that the underrepresentation of women in clinical studies “presents a 
major challenge in applying the results” of those studies to women). 
135 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
136 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
137 Id. at 531. 
138 Id. at 533. 
139 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down a state gender-based statutory 
scheme requiring husbands to pay alimony after a divorce but not wives); Weinberger v. 
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (striking down a gender-based statutory scheme in 
which Social Security benefits are paid to a widow and her children if a husband dies, but 
which gives such benefits only to the children when the deceased parent is the mother). 
140 Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Comment, Geduldig Reborn:  Hibbs as a Success (?) of Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg’s Sex Discrimination Strategy, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 581–82 (2005). 
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to imagine how limiting access to medical treatment options would 
benefit women.  It remains to be seen whether courts would find con-
stitutional a ban on women’s access to a medical treatment option 
which is not beneficial to women.  The government would probably 
seek to justify its actions by indicating that the treatment option is not 
sufficiently safe or effective for women.  Yet it is unclear if this justifi-
cation would be “exceedingly persuasive” to the court.  Thus, it seems 
that some legal safeguards exist to protect women from being cate-
gorically denied access to certain medical treatment options on the 
basis of CER findings, but this safeguard should perhaps be streng-
thened. 
C. Banning Treatment Options on the Basis of Age 
Opponents of comparative effectiveness research have often ex-
pressed concern that the results of such research would be used to 
disadvantage the elderly.141  These fears may be warranted, since 
courts have generally applied a mere rational basis test when review-
ing laws that are disadvantageous for the elderly.142  Historically, laws 
subject to rational basis review have been upheld,143 though they may 
be struck down in rare circumstances if they express animus or pre-
judice toward a particular group.144  If the government decides to use 
comparative effectiveness research findings to deny the elderly access 
to certain treatment options, impacted individuals have little option 
for recourse on the basis of judicial precedent alone. 
Some might argue that protections for the elderly are provided by 
explicit language in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
stating that “[t]he Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from 
comparative clinical effectiveness research . . . in a manner that treats 
extending the life of an elderly . . . individual as of lower value than 
 
141 John Donnelly, Health Policy Brief:  Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF., 4–5 
(Oct. 8, 2010) available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/
healthpolicybrief_28.pdf (indicating public concerns about using comparative effective-
ness research). 
142 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1976) (applying rational basis re-
view and upholding a mandatory retirement law for state police officers because people 
over fifty years of age have neither experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment 
nor been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not 
truly indicative of their abilities). 
143 See e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (applying rational basis 
review to uphold a state regulation). 
144 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that a 
law subject to rational basis review may be found invalid if the law is driven by prejudice 
or animosity). 
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extending the life of an individual who is younger.”145  However, these 
protections only relate to “determining coverage, reimbursement, or 
incentive programs.”146 
These provisions seem to have a few loopholes.  They do not pro-
vide guidelines for how the quality of life of an elderly individual 
should be valued when weighed against extending the life of or the 
quality of life of an individual who is younger, nor do they provide 
guidelines regarding government decisions about access to certain 
treatment options.  The Act seems to allow the government to choose 
not to provide financial coverage for a certain treatment option to 
anyone while simultaneously making it legal for non-elderly individu-
als to access the treatment option and illegal for elderly individuals to 
access the treatment option.  Such a ruling would likely be scrutinized 
by the courts using a standard of rational basis review, which means 
the ruling is likely to be upheld.147  Of course, if the courts view the 
regulation as being created with animus or prejudice toward the el-
derly, they will sometimes strike it down, using more of a “rational ba-
sis with bite” standard.148  The elderly could potentially be banned 
from accessing a certain treatment option on the basis of CER results.  
The courts would likely invoke this “rational basis with bite” standard 
of review to strike down the statute, as such a scenario would seem to 
involve prejudice toward the elderly.149 
However, if the government bans the elderly from accessing a cer-
tain FDA-approved drug because CER shows that this drug is signifi-
cantly less effective among the elderly, the government could argue 
that its decision does not involve animus or prejudice toward the el-
derly.  Rather, the government would claim that its decision is 
grounded in real differences between the elderly and younger indi-
viduals.  Such real differences would likely pass the weak rational ba-
sis standard that would be applied by the courts, and the ban would 
likely be upheld.  Since regulations which disadvantage individuals on 
 
145 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301(a), 124 Stat. 
119, 740 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1301e-1).  For the purposes of the Act, the 
life of a disabled person also cannot be treated as having lower value than the life of an 
individual who is not disabled.  The way in which this provision interacts with the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. II 
2008), would be an interesting topic for further research and discussion, but it is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
146 Id. 
147 See supra note 143. 
148 Pettinga, supra note 100, at 780. 
149 Id. at 779–80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the emergence of the “ra-
tional basis with bite” standard of review). 
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the basis of age historically do not receive any form of heightened 
judicial scrutiny, it seems that the government could, guided by CER 
findings, successfully prevent access to certain treatment options on 
the basis of age. 
V. GOVERNMENT ALTERING OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO 
IMPEDE ACCESS TO CERTAIN MEDICAL TREATMENT OPTIONS 
The federal government may indeed be able, constitutionally, to 
deny access to drugs and the vast majority of medical procedures, but 
such outright denial of access is likely to be viewed by the public un-
favorably and as a rather drastic measure.150  It seems more likely that 
the federal government will attempt to use CER results simply to dis-
courage use of certain medical treatment options that it deems less 
safe or effective than competitors.  One way in which the government 
can seek to discourage use of a given medical treatment option is by 
imposing procedural barriers that impede access to that option. 
The federal and state governments have, in fact, sought to use a 
variety of procedural barriers to impede access to abortion proce-
dures,151 and an examination of this line of cases illuminates the im-
plications of the government seeking to extend such procedural bar-
riers to comparative effectiveness research.152  These cases 
demonstrate that the federal government is limited in its ability to use 
procedural barriers to impede access to medical treatments asso-
ciated with fundamental rights,153 but medical treatments that are not 
 
150 See Wendy K. Mariner, Rationing Health Care and the Need for Credible Scarcity:  Why Americans 
Can’t Say No, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1439, 1442 (1995) (explaining why there is public 
mistrust of health care rationing). 
151 See LaShunda R. Lowe, Note, An Inside Look at Partial Birth Abortion, 24 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 327, 342 (1999) (discussing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), in which the Supreme 
Court held that states may not make abortions unreasonably difficult to access by erecting 
complex procedural barriers); see also M. Lisa Wilson-Clayton & Mark A. Clayton, Two 
Steps Forward, One Step Back:  McKay v. Bergstedt, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 439, 454–55 (1991) 
(discussing how a patient who wishes to discontinue life-sustaining treatment may have to 
first work through a vast “procedural matrix” (quoting McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 
629 (Nev. 1990))). 
152 See Richard Wasserman, Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions:  Post Roe and Doe Litiga-
tion and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (1974) (discussing how some state gov-
ernments have attempted to use elaborate procedural barriers to discourage abortions). 
153 See Gene Lindsey, The Viability of Parental Abortion Notification and Consent Statutes:  Assessing 
Fact and Fiction, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 881–82 (1989) (describing how many state statutes 
impose parental consent or notice requirements on minor’s seeking abortions); see also 
Clyde Moore, Case Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota:  The Fog Clears from Parental Notice Laws, 
16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 399, 413 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), upholding forty-eight hour waiting periods 
prior to abortion procedures). 
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associated with fundamental rights are unlikely to be subject to such 
limitations. 
If the government seeks to use procedural barriers to impede 
access to a medical treatment option associated with a fundamental 
right, a claim alleging a violation of substantive due process rights is 
likely to be raised.  The first element of a substantive due process 
claim, the state action requirement, would clearly be met.154  In order 
to assess the constitutional merits of such a claim, it may be helpful to 
consider the case of Carey v. Population Services International. 
In Carey, the Supreme Court held that “where a decision as fun-
damental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regula-
tions imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling 
state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those in-
terests.”155  The Court then struck down a state statute prohibiting dis-
tribution of non-medical contraceptives to individuals sixteen years of 
age or older, except through licensed pharmacists, on the grounds 
that the law was not justified by a sufficiently compelling governmen-
tal interest.156 
While Carey involved access to contraceptives, a number of cases 
relating to abortion also demonstrate that when a state attempts to 
prevent access to a fundamental right through additional, unduly 
burdensome procedural requirements, the courts generally have not 
found the state interest to be narrowly tailored and have struck down 
these state-imposed requirements as unconstitutional.157  In Doe v. Bol-
ton, portions of an abortion law in Georgia that sought to regulate 
medical procedures were deemed an unconstitutional infringement 
on substantive due process rights to an abortion.158  The Supreme 
Court invalidated provisions requiring that abortions be performed 
in a Joint Commission-accredited159 hospital, that the abortion be ap-
proved by a hospital staff abortion committee, and that the perform-
ing physician’s judgment be confirmed by two independent examina-
 
154 See Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865, 
889 (2007) (discussing how challenges to procedural regulations of abortion remain 
largely focused on due process). 
155 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). 
156 Id. at 697–99. 
157 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down overly burdensome procedural re-
quirements for obtaining an abortion). 
158 Id. at 201. 
159 Until 2007, the Joint Commission was known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Hospital Organizations.  See The Joint Commission’s Brand Identity, JOINT COMMISSION, 
http://www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/brand.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
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tions of the patient by two other licensed physicians.160  The state 
claimed that it was imposing these requirements to protect the wom-
an’s health and the potential human life of the unborn child, but the 
Court determined that the state’s means of achieving its compelling 
interests were not narrowly tailored.161 
Another case in which the Court struck down overly burdensome 
procedural regulations of abortions was Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health (Akron I).162  In this case, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a requirement that abortions performed after the first trimes-
ter be performed in a hospital rather than in outpatient facilities, 
which were typically less expensive, as well as a twenty-four-hour wait-
ing period before a woman could undergo her abortion.163  In Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court struck down a state 
requirement that a woman obtain consent from her spouse prior to 
obtaining an abortion.164  In Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. 
Ashcroft, the Court held that a state could involve a parent in a mi-
nor’s abortion decision if it also provided an alternative judicial by-
pass procedure so that the parental involvement would not amount 
to a potentially arbitrary and absolute veto.165  This holding built on 
the Court’s earlier finding that a parental consent requirement was 
unconstitutional only if it “unduly burdens the right to seek an abor-
tion.”166 
The outcome of these cases is applicable to concerns about poten-
tial government use of comparative effectiveness research findings.  If 
comparative effectiveness research findings indicate that certain med-
ical treatment options are less desirable than others on the basis of 
quality or safety, the aforementioned cases suggest that, where the 
treatment option pertains to a right deemed fundamental by the 
courts, the government may be limited in imposing procedural bar-
riers.  Of course, given that the Courts have only found an affirmative 
right to medical treatment involving contraceptives, abortion, and 
medical care for prisoners,167 as well as refusal of medical treatment, 
 
160 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 201. 
161 Id. at 187. 
162 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating unduly burdensome abortion-related requirements). 
163 Id. at 452. 
164 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). 
165 Planned Parenthood of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–491 (1983) (noting pre-
vious cases declined to allow parental consent to serve as an absolute veto on a minor’s 
desire to obtain an abortion). 
166 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976). 
167 See Pedersen, supra note 112, at 808–09 (discussing the medical treatments that have been 
recognized by the courts as “constitutionally-protected”). 
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the vast majority of medical treatment options for which procedural 
barriers are erected would likely be subject to mere rational basis re-
view.  While fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny and re-
quire the government to show that its action is necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest, rational basis review requires the minimum 
level of scrutiny.168  When rational basis review is employed, the bur-
den of proof is on the complainant and that standard requires only 
that the government action be “rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”169  Thus, the government may indeed have substantial flex-
ibility in using procedural barriers to hinder access to medical treat-
ment options unassociated with fundamental rights (which are the 
majority of medical treatments) if CER findings suggest these treat-
ment options are inferior to other comparable forms of treatment. 
A. Government Restrictions on Financial Assistance for Medical Treatments 
There is one potential barrier to treatment in which courts have 
fairly consistently upheld government decisions that impede access, 
even where a fundamental interest such as abortion is implicated.  
This unique barrier is restrictions on public subsidies.170  The relevant 
line of cases confirms the notion that the Constitution embodies 
primarily negative, rather than positive, liberties.171  These cases also 
indicate that the government may constitutionally use a restriction on 
public subsidies to impede access to seemingly any medical treatment 
option deemed less desirable on the basis of CER findings, even if 
such medical treatment options are considered fundamental rights. 
Several cases have raised due process challenges to restrictions on 
public subsidies in the context of medical treatment options deemed 
fundamental, such as abortion.172  In Harris v. McRae, for instance, the 
claimants sought to enjoin enforcement of the Hyde Amendment173 
 
168 See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 
805–06 (2006) (discussing the differences between strict scrutiny and rational basis review 
with respect to due process). 
169 Id. at 806 (emphasis omitted). 
170 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–470 (1977) (holding that there was no constitutional 
requirement that the government fund abortions for indigent women). 
171 See Gary A. Winters, Unconstitutional Conditions as “Nonsubsidies”:  When Is Deference Inappro-
priate?, 80 GEO. L.J. 131, 135–36 (1991) (discussing how, under the “negative” theory of 
constitutional liberty, government is defined primarily by what it may not do, rather than 
by what it may or must do). 
172 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing that the right to privacy encom-
passes a woman’s right to an abortion). 
173 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (Hyde Amendment), Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§ 507–08, 
123 Stat. 524, 802–03 (providing that state funds may not be used to fund abortion pro-
cedures except if the mother’s life would be endangered were the fetus carried to term or 
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on the grounds that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.174  The plaintiffs argued that a state participating in Me-
dicaid ought to be obligated on constitutional grounds to fund all 
medically necessary abortions.175  The Supreme Court ultimately held 
that “the Hyde Amendment does not impinge on the due process li-
berty recognized in [Roe].”176  The Court noted that the amendment 
did not place any governmental obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion but simply encouraged alternative activity deemed in 
the public interest.177  The Court added that, despite the fact that Roe 
recognized abortion as a fundamental right embedded in the due 
process guarantees of the Constitution: 
[I]t simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with 
it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of 
the full range of protected choices . . . . [A]lthough government may not 
place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of 
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation.  Indigency falls 
in the latter category.”178 
The Supreme Court re-affirmed this holding in subsequent cases.  
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, for instance, the Court upheld 
provisions of Missouri law barring the use of public employees and 
facilities for non-therapeutic abortions, even where the patient paid 
for the abortion herself.179  The Supreme Court re-iterated its pre-
viously indicated stance that “the Due Process Clause[] generally con-
fer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid 
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which 
the government itself may not deprive the individual.”180  The Su-
 
if the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest and the incident has been promptly reported 
to a law enforcement agency).  The Hyde Amendment was first enacted in 1977.  See De-
partments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).  It is a rider which is attached to the annual 
Medicaid appropriations bill each year.  See Jennifer Keighley, Health Care Reform and Re-
productive Rights:  Sex Equality Arguments for Abortion Coverage in a National Plan, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 357, 359 (2010). 
174 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (“The constitutional question . . . is whether 
the Hyde Amendment, by denying public funding for certain medically necessary abor-
tions, contravenes the liberty or equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment . . . .”). 
175 Id. at 307–08. 
176 Id. at 318. 
177 Id. at 315. 
178 See id. at 316 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)). 
179 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507–11 (1989). 
180 Id. at 507 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 
(1989)). 
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preme Court upheld similar financial restrictions in Rust v. Sullivan.181  
In this case, the Department of Health and Human Services’ practice 
of only granting family planning projects funding under Title X to 
entities that agreed not to provide information on abortions was chal-
lenged.182  The Court noted that “[t]he financial constraints that re-
strict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitu-
tionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of 
governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her in-
digency.”183 
Despite the Court’s seemingly consistent determinations that the 
Constitution does not impose an obligation on states to pay the med-
ical expenses of indigents, even with respect to medical treatment op-
tions deemed fundamental rights, there is at least one population 
that has been granted an affirmative right to health care treatment by 
the state:  prisoners.184  When a “special custodial or other relation-
ship” between an individual and the state exists, as occurs when the 
state or municipality exercises custody, control, coercion, dominion, 
or restraint over an individual, a constitutional duty arises for that 
state or municipality to grant a general right to the provision of med-
ical care and treatment by the state.185  Estelle v. Gamble held that pris-
oners have an affirmative right to such care.186  When the government 
fails to provide health care to prisoners, it acts in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.187 
 
181 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding that restrictions on use of public 
funds for abortion-related services did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments to the 
Constitution). 
182 See id. at 177–78, 181 (discussing petitioners’ reasons for bringing suit). 
183 Id. at 203 (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 316). 
184 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding that the government has an obli-
gation to provide medical care for the incarcerated, as “[a]n inmate must rely on prison 
authorities to treat his medical needs”). 
185 See Ralph M. Rivera, Note, The Mentally Ill Offender:  A Brighter Tomorrow Through the Eyes of 
the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 
111–12 (2004-05) (discussing how, when the government has a special or custodial rela-
tionship with individuals such as prisoners, the government has a constitutional obliga-
tion to provide such individuals with necessary medical services). 
186 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (establishing that prisoners have an affirmative right to medical 
care). 
187 See Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 533, 561 (1978) (“It is thus well settled that the government has a constitu-
tional duty to provide for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.  When the gov-
ernment fails to fulfill this duty it violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment.” (footnotes omit-
ted)).  Unfortunately for prisoners, while they technically have an affirmative right to 
health care, in reality, this right is difficult to enforce.  When a prison patient is treated 
negligently or experiences malpractice, the prisoner must prove that there was “delibe-
rate indifference to [his or her] serious medical needs,” which is challenging legal stan-
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These cases indicate that, at least from the substantive due process 
perspective, opponents of the use of comparative effectiveness re-
search findings are unlikely to be successful in challenging the gov-
ernment should it choose to use such findings as guidelines for re-
stricting public subsidies for certain forms of treatment.  The only li-
mitation on the government if it wishes to restrict access in this 
manner might be in a scenario where a prisoner requires a subsidy for 
treatment. 
While challenges to restrictions on public funding for a certain 
medical treatment option will generally prove unsuccessful, an at-
tempt could still be made to challenge such restrictions on Medicare 
or Medicaid funding on equal protection grounds.  The alleged clas-
sification would be on the basis of wealth.188  In cases such as San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has de-
termined that classifications on the basis of wealth do not trigger 
strict scrutiny.189  Strict scrutiny analysis is also employed in cases that 
involve a right deemed by the courts to be fundamental, but as has 
been discussed, the Court has determined that U.S. citizens do not 
have a fundamental right to health care.190  Thus, the vast majority of 
equal protection claims to a certain health care treatment would be 
viewed under the rational basis test, the lowest level of judicial scruti-
ny.191  This minimal level of scrutiny would most likely be applied to 
an equal protection challenge of a law which restricts public subsidies 
for a health care treatment deemed less safe or effective than compet-
itors on the basis of CER.  Since it is not difficult for the government 
to overcome this low threshold of judicial scrutiny, the court would 
likely uphold most government laws or polices that restrict public 
 
dard to meet.  Rivera, supra note 186, at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
in practice, this right for prisoners is rather narrowly defined. 
188 See Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law:  The Need for a 
New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 353–54 (1986) (discussing the judicial 
standard utilized to assess wealth classifications in equal protection cases). 
189 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to apply a 
judicial strict scrutiny standard in a case involving a classification on the basis of wealth); 
see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that courts are generally unwilling to apply a strict scrutiny standard to classifications 
on the basis of wealth); Back, supra note 58, at 255–56 (providing support for the notion 
that courts are generally unwilling to apply the strict scrutiny standard where a wealth 
classification is at issue). 
190 See Mariner, supra note 189, at 360 (discussing how the Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to categorize health care as a fundamental right). 
191 See Back, supra note 58, at 256–57 (discussing the minimum rationality test for equal pro-
tection analysis). 
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subsidies for certain health care treatments on the basis of CER find-
ings. 
An examination of the case law regarding this issue helps to eluci-
date how these issues are generally viewed by the courts.  In Maher v. 
Roe, for instance, the claimants challenged a Connecticut regulation 
granting Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not for medically unne-
cessary abortions, claiming this law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.192  The Court ultimately 
upheld the regulation, stating that the law did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.193  The Court determined that the regulation did 
not create an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion 
and noted that “this Court has never held that financial need alone 
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”194  
The Court also determined that it was unnecessary for a state to show 
a compelling interest in favoring normal childbirth over abortion in 
order for the law to be upheld.  The fact that the state had at least a 
legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth satisfied the 
Court that the law should be upheld.195 
As noted previously, the Supreme Court rejected a due process vi-
olation claim in Harris v. McRae.196  In this case, the Court also re-
jected a claim that the federal funding limitations of the Hyde 
Amendment constituted a violation of the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.197  The Court 
noted that the Hyde Amendment, which disproportionately impacted 
the poor, was not predicated on a constitutionally suspect classifica-
tion.198  “[P]overty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”199  
Thus, the rational basis test was applied, and the court found that the 
law was indeed rationally related to a legitimate government interest 
 
192 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 467 (1977). 
193 Id. at 470. 
194 Id. at 471. 
195 See id. at 469–70 (explaining why the state may constitutionally subsidize the costs of 
childbirth while declining to subsidize the costs of abortion); see also LYNN D. WARDLE, 
THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE:  A COMPENDIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL COURT 
ABORTION CASES 261 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Maher). 
196 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (“Although the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interferences 
with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an 
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that free-
dom.”). 
197 See id. at 324 (finding the government regulation to withstand equal protection analysis). 
198 See id. at 323 (finding that the poor women impacted by the regulation did not constitute 
a suspect class). 
199 Id. 
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since “the Hyde Amendment bears a rational relationship to its legi-
timate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.”200 
Despite the general failure of equal protection economic rights 
claims in federal courts when alleging a violation of the federal con-
stitutional right to equal protection,201 those who oppose such fund-
ing restrictions on medical treatments deemed fundamental rights 
may find success in certain state courts when alleging a violation of a 
state constitutional right to equal protection.202  While not all state 
constitutions have explicit equal protection language as provided in 
the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, all of the U.S. state 
constitutions have been interpreted as requiring equal protection of 
the laws.  In some states cases, “broad guarantees of individual rights 
have been interpreted to require equal protection of the laws.”203  In 
other states, “multiple provisions” have been interpreted as “collec-
tively providing equal protection” of the laws.204  While some chal-
lenges to abortion funding restrictions have been successful when al-
leging a violation of a state constitution’s equal protection guarantee, 
it is perhaps worth noting that no state court has found a right to 
public funding for abortions when the state does not provide public 
funding for pregnancy-related services.205 
A number of recent challenges to such regulations have argued 
that funding restrictions on abortions burden equal protection guar-
antees of state constitutions.206  California, Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, and West Virginia have held that the state govern-
ment’s refusal to provide funding for abortions while opting to 
provide funding for other medical procedures burdens the funda-
mental right to have an abortion as established in Roe.207  The courts 
in these states grounded their decision in the “neutrality doctrine,” 
under which, “once the government acts in a particular area, it must 
 
200 Id. at 324. 
201 See id. (dismissing a claim that a federal law violated equal protection rights of the U.S. 
Constitution); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (dismissing a claim that a 
state abortion law violated equal protection rights of the U.S. Constitution). 
202 See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts:  The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 
LAW & INEQ. 239, 281 (1999) (noting recent state cases alleging violations of equal pro-
tection rights). 
203 Caroline M. Krastek, The Alabama Constitution Fails to Provide Either Express or Implied Guar-
antees of Equality.  In re Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172 (Ala. 1999), 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1233, 1244–45 
(2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Consti-
tutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
204 Id. 
205 Jeffrey, supra note 203, at 283. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 282. 
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act in a constitutionally neutral manner.”208  In the context of public 
funding for abortion, these courts concluded that once the state 
makes a decision to provide Medicaid funding for pregnancy-related 
health care, the state cannot then restrict funding for abortions, as 
the state would not be acting in a neutral manner.209 
Oregon has determined that state funding restrictions on abor-
tions constitute a violation of equal protection of Oregon’s constitu-
tion.210  The Oregon court considering this issue acknowledged that 
Roe protects the right to an abortion.  The court determined that 
providing Medicaid funding for abortions only for women who re-
quired the abortion for medical reasons was a form of discrimination 
that required the court to weigh the harm to individuals affected by 
the state action against the state’s justification.211  Upon implement-
ing this balancing test, the Oregon court concluded that the state’s 
justification, which included cost savings and safeguarding potential 
life, did not outweigh the potentially harmful effects to women’s 
health.212  Thus, the court determined that state funding restrictions 
on abortions violated the Oregon Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause.213 
However, four states—Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and 
Pennsylvania—have held that a state government’s abortion funding 
restrictions do not burden the fundamental right to have an abor-
tion.214  These courts applied mere rational basis review in determin-
ing whether to uphold the state’s abortion funding restrictions.215  
They determined that the state interests in “protecting potential life, 
promoting childbirth, and promoting infant health” afforded suffi-
cient justification for the states’ restrictions.216  These courts also con-
cluded that their respective states’ restrictions were indeed “rationally 
related” to these objectives.217 
These cases suggest that the federal government cannot generally 
be prevented on substantive due process grounds or equal protection 
grounds from restricting public subsidies for medical treatment op-
tions based on CER findings.  However, opponents of such funding 
 
208 Id. at 283. 
209 Id. 
210 See id. at 282 (discussing the unique stance adopted by the Oregon courts). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 285–86. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 286. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 286–87. 
217 Id. 
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restrictions may have success in challenging state-initiated funding re-
strictions, at least with respect to medical treatment options deemed 
fundamental rights, on the grounds that such restrictions violate 
equal protection provisions of a given state’s constitution. 
Additionally, opponents of government funding restrictions based 
on CER findings can undoubtedly use to their advantage any restric-
tions that, in some manner, also create classifications on the basis of 
race or gender.  For instance, acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) disproportionately impacts the black community.218  If the 
government decides, on the basis of comparative effectiveness re-
search findings, to stop providing reimbursement through Medicaid 
or Medicare for a particular AIDS treatment, an equal protection 
claim could be brought on the grounds that the decision makes a 
classification based not only on wealth but also on race.  In light of 
the indirect racial classification associated with the direct classifica-
tion based on wealth, an argument could be advanced that the gov-
ernment’s decision to restrict public subsidies for this treatment op-
tion should be subject to the strict scrutiny standard.219  The courts 
would have to find the government’s reasoning for this classification 
to be compelling and the means of achieving this goal to be “narrow-
ly tailored” to the government’s legitimate interest, which is a very 
high burden for the government.220  The government would probably 
have to argue that its interest pertained to safety, effectiveness, or sav-
ing money.  It is difficult to say with certainty whether the courts 
would consider these interests to be sufficiently compelling and 
whether the government could narrowly tailor its means of achieving 
these interests, but, historically, the government has very rarely been 
able to meet the burden of proof required in strict scrutiny cases.  
 
218 See Fighting HIV Among African Americans:  A Heightened National Response, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/aa/
resources/factsheets/pdf/AA_response_media_fact.pdf (stating that while blacks account 
for approximately 13% of the U.S. population, they account for roughly half of the 
people who suffer from HIV/AIDS). 
219 See Michael A. Helfand, How the Diversity Rationale Lays the Groundwork for New Discrimina-
tion:  Examining the Trajectory of Equal Protection Doctrine, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 
618–19 (2009) (stating that a party does need not demonstrate “invidious discriminatory 
intent against a racial class” to “trigger strict scrutiny”); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be in-
ferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including . . . that the law bears more heavily 
on one race than another”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1268 (2007) (describing the judicial strict scrutiny standard). 
220 See Roozbeh B. Baker, Balancing Competing Priorities:  Affirmative Action in the United States 
and Canada, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 527, 530–32 (2009) (discussing the ra-
tional basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny standards for equal protection 
claims). 
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Thus, courts are less likely to uphold a government regulation prohi-
biting public subsidies for medical treatments that disproportionately 
impact a certain racial group or suspect class. 
Presumably, a heightened scrutiny standard of intermediate scru-
tiny, which applies to regulations that discriminate on the basis of 
gender,221 would also apply to government restrictions on public sub-
sidies that disproportionately affect one gender.  However, in prac-
tice, courts have declined to apply a heightened intermediate scrutiny 
standard in equal protection claims in at least one area of medical 
treatment:  abortion.222  It remains unclear whether there is a unique 
aspect of the abortion context that warrants this diversion from gen-
eral equal protection analysis or whether such holdings signal the 
courts’ reluctance, more broadly, to view government determinations 
about public subsidies for medical treatment options under heigh-
tened forms of scrutiny. 
VI. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 
A new government rule that deprives an individual of certain 
health benefits without appropriate procedures, as required by the 
procedural due process guarantees of the Constitution, may also be 
found unconstitutional.  In Perry v. Sindermann, the Court found that 
individuals deprived of liberty or property are entitled to certain due 
process procedural protections.223  If a U.S. citizen has regularly had a 
certain treatment subsidized by Medicare or Medicaid and the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services promulgates a 
rule prohibiting future access to that treatment, the affected individ-
ual could attempt to claim a deprivation of property. 
If a court agrees that such a rule deprives the individual of liberty 
or property interests, the entitlement threshold for procedural due 
process is met, and the court must establish what process is due or, 
rather, what procedural protections must be afforded to protect the 
 
221 See id. at 530 (“Courts review legislation that classifies people on the basis of gend-
er . . . for the purposes of treating them differently under the intermediate scrutiny 
test.”). 
222 See Mary Catherine Wilcox, Why the Equal Protection Clause Cannot “Fix” Abortion Law, 7 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2008) (“The Court has refused to apply intermediate scrutiny 
in cases of restrictions on public funding of abortion and abortion clinic regulations, re-
peatedly holding that such restrictions and regulations do not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.”); see also Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 547–48 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding a statutory and regulatory scheme covering abortion to be gender-neutral 
on its face and thus not subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
223 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
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individual’s interests.224  The Mathews v. Eldridge “balancing test” will 
then be applied.  This test considers three distinct factors:  (1) “the 
private interest . . . affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional . . . procedural safe-
guards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
. . . procedural requirement would entail.”225 
Goldberg v. Kelly established that the Procedural Due Process 
Clause requires an evidentiary hearing before the termination of cer-
tain benefits, such as welfare benefits.226  However, the Court in Ma-
thews found that an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of social 
security disability benefit payments was not required by the Constitu-
tion’s Due Process Clause.227  The Court in Mathews distinguished 
Goldberg by noting that the entitlement decision in Mathews was de-
rived from the physician, who could provide unbiased medical re-
ports and communicate effectively, rather than through the individu-
al, as was the case in Goldberg.  If the government issues new rules, 
based on CER findings, which leave the determination of whether 
someone is eligible for a given treatment in the hands of a physician, 
Mathews suggests that a physician’s decision that the patient no long-
er requires the treatment may be upheld by the courts; no further 
procedural protections need be afforded to protect the individual’s 
interests. 
However, decisions by the government to exclude certain catego-
ries of individuals, on the basis of CER findings, from access to health 
care treatment options would perhaps be more similar to the scena-
rio in Heckler v. Campbell, in which medical-vocational guidelines were 
promulgated to help systematically determine an individual’s capacity 
for work in the national economy once the applicant’s age, work ex-
perience, education, and physical condition were established.  The 
Supreme Court upheld the issuance and use of the medical-
vocational guidelines in Heckler, since the determination of whether 
jobs existed for a particular claimant was not unique to each clai-
mant.228   
 
224 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
225 Id. at 335. 
226 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970). 
227 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 339–40. 
228 Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983) (“To require the Secretary to relitigate the 
existence of jobs in the national economy at each hearing would hinder needlessly an al-
ready overburdened agency.  We conclude that the Secretary [of the Department of 
Health and Human Services]’s use of medical-vocational guidelines does not conflict with 
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Similarly, the government might be able to argue that CER find-
ings clearly show that a certain treatment never works for some cate-
gory of individuals, such as all individuals over age sixty-five.  The 
government could then issue guidelines specifying that individuals 
over age sixty-five cannot have access to the treatment, and the court 
might be willing to uphold the guidelines.  The court would presum-
ably uphold the guidelines on the theory that a unique hearing need 
not be held for each individual over age sixty-five who wishes to re-
litigate this issue where the scientific evidence is clear-cut. 
However, regulations that incorporate general guidelines are not 
always upheld.  The Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Zerbly, for instance, 
overturned the Social Security Administration’s reliance on child-
ren’s disability regulations to deny, without an adjudicatory hearing, 
benefits to a child claimant under a Supplemental Security Income 
program.  The Court found that the guidelines did not sufficiently 
account for all the conditions that could prevent a child from under-
taking normal activities.229  This case suggests that courts may over-
turn government guidelines that do not sufficiently account for all of 
the variables that should factor into whether an individual may have 
access to a given treatment. 
VII. GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE AND PRIVATE ACTORS 
The aforementioned scenarios pertain to direct government regu-
lations to deny access or render more difficult to obtain certain med-
ical treatment options on the basis of CER findings.  Analysis of the 
case law suggests that such governmental action will generally be con-
stitutionally permissible.  However, the question remains whether 
there are any constitutional limitations on government efforts to in-
fluence private actors to utilize CER findings to help reduce health 
care costs.  The next portion of this Comment will explore this ques-
tion in the context of government restrictions on health care invest-
ments by private entities and health care licensing mandates.230 
 
the statute, nor can we say on the record before us that they are arbitrary and capri-
cious.”). 
229 Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 540–41 (1990). 
230 Ideas for the general issues to be discussed in this portion of this Comment were drawn 
substantially from James F. Blumstein’s Rationing Medical Resources:  A Constitutional, Legal, 
and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1386–90 (1981) (discussing restrictions on the 
use of private funds, including Certificate of Need (CON) laws and licensing require-
ments). 
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A. Government Restrictions on Health Care Investments by Private Entities 
In an effort to control health care costs and render more equita-
ble distribution of health care resources, many states at one point 
adopted Certificate of Need (CON) legislation, mandated by Con-
gress in the National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Act (NHPRDA) of 1974.231  Under this Act, when a health care facility 
wished to begin providing a new service that would entail acquiring 
medical equipment exceeding $400,000, capital expenditures exceed-
ing $600,000 (indexed for inflation), or certain other particularly 
costly endeavors, the facility had to request a CON statement.232  Such 
a statement, issued by a state agency, served as a formal acknowled-
gement by the state that the additional service or equipment was 
“needed.”233 
The NHPRDA was repealed fewer than ten years after it was 
enacted.234  As a result, the national CON law requirements no longer 
exist.  However, a number of states continue to manage their own 
CON law programs, though CON law requirements are certainly less 
common than they once were.  State governments could seek to util-
ize certificate-of-need requests as a means of limiting certain services 
within private facilities that are deemed less desirable on the basis 
CER findings.  Affected individuals could bring suits alleging viola-
tions of their due process or equal protection rights.  However, the 
relevant case law suggests that such restrictions would most likely pass 
constitutional muster on both due process and equal protection 
grounds.235 
For instance, in Madarang v. Bermudes, a group of dentists brought 
a suit alleging a violation of their substantive due process rights to 
protest a CON law prohibiting them from building a dental clinic.236  
Acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court’s pattern of upholding eco-
 
231 See Lowell M. Zeta, Note, Fundamental First Steps Along the Road to Health Care Reform, 41 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 727, 748 (2008) (discussing the impact of CON regulations on health 
care costs); see also Blumstein, supra note 231, at 1386 (discussing provider investment and 
revenue restrictions). 
232 See Roberta M. Roos, Note, Certificate of Need for Health Care Facilities:  A Time for Re-
Examination, 7 PACE L. REV. 491, 496–503 (1987) (discussing restrictions and require-
ments under CON laws). 
233 Id. at 491. 
234 See Gerard R. Coulet, Certificate-of-Need over Hospitals in Rhode Island:  A Forty-Year Retrospec-
tive, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 127 (2010) (“[R]eform legislation . . . lasted for 
only nine years before it was repealed.”). 
235 See Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253–54 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the CON 
regulation on equal protection, procedural due process, and substantive due process 
grounds). 
236 See id. at 252–53 (applying Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis). 
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nomic regulations, the court of appeals determined that the CON law 
did not constitute a violation of substantive due process.237  The court 
of appeals also concluded that the law satisfied the applicable rational 
basis test, as “the Commonwealth [had] a legitimate interest in pre-
venting the establishment of unneeded facilities,” and “the CON reg-
ulations [were] rationally related to” that end.238  The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey upheld the constitutionality of the state’s CON laws on 
similar grounds in In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage.239  
These cases suggest that if states attempt to make use of CER research 
through their CON requirements, lawsuits by affected individuals al-
leging violations of their substantive due process or equal protection 
rights are unlikely to succeed. 
B. The Government, Private Actors, and Licensing Requirements 
Constitutional challenges have previously been brought against 
government licensing requirements.  In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 
the plaintiff alleged that a state act affirmatively facilitated, encour-
aged, or authorized private discrimination.240  The Court held that 
state alcohol licensing of a private club that refused to serve black 
guests does not constitute sufficient state action to render such licens-
ing a violation of Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against dis-
crimination.241  The Court noted that the distinction between private 
and public entities would become meaningless if the Fourteenth 
Amendment was held to apply to a private entity whenever such an 
entity received any sort of benefit or service from the state or was sub-
ject to any state regulation.242 
 
237 See id. at 253–54 (establishing that there was no violation of substantive or procedural due 
process). 
238 See id. at 253; Robert M. Anderson, The Judiciary’s Inability to Strike Down Healthcare Service 
Certificate of Need Laws Through Economic Substantive Due Process:  A Call for Legislative Action, 
2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703, 725–28 (2008) (quoting Madarang, 889 F.2d at 253). 
239 See In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage, 693 A.2d 133, 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1997) (“[T]he administrative regulation challenged on this appeal is rationally 
related to the legislative goal, and we will not declare it unconstitutional.”). 
240 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1972) (setting forth the plaintiff’s 
allegations). 
241 See id. at 178–79 (holding that the state alcohol license of a private club which discrimi-
nates against its members does not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
242 See id. at 173 (“The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by a[] . . . private 
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any 
sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any 
degree whatever. . . . [s]uch a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between 
private as distinguished from state conduct . . . .”). 
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Government licensing can be used in the medical context to dis-
courage a particular activity or use of a particular type of provider 
deemed less beneficial on the basis of CER results.  For instance, if 
CER results show that deliveries are more successful when performed 
by a physician rather than a midwife,243 the government could prom-
ulgate a rule which says that it is unlawful for deliveries to be over-
seen by anyone other than a physician (except, perhaps, in excep-
tional circumstances).  At some point, CER findings may indicate that 
the ability to exercise a certain fundamental right, such as the right to 
an abortion, is best done in a certain facility, such as a hospital.  The 
relevant case law suggests that, so long as the government can show it 
has a compelling interest and has narrowly tailored its means of 
achieving that interest, licensing restrictions that prohibit other facili-
ties from providing abortion services could potentially be upheld.244 
Lawsuits alleging violations of substantive due process may not be 
brought against private individuals unless state action is implicated.245  
Yet, echoing the Moose Lodge holding, hospitals generally may not be 
deemed state actors merely because they receive Medicare and Medi-
caid funds and are subject to state regulations, such as licensing re-
quirements.246  Similarly, nursing homes cannot be deemed state ac-
tors merely because they receive funding from the state and are 
subject to state regulations.247  Health care facilities that received Hill-
Burton funds are also not automatically deemed state actors on that 
basis.248 
 
243 See Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of Educ., 109 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that pa-
tients do not have a constitutional right to access unlicensed providers). 
244 See supra Part III.B and note 122. 
245 See Julie K. Brown, Less Is More:  Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 
561 (2008). 
246 See Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1993) (establishing that the hospital “is not 
a state actor, and cannot be considered as such solely because it receives medicare [sic] 
and medicaid [sic] funds and is subject to state regulation”). 
247 See Diagle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1349 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The exis-
tence of state regulation and the receipt of state funding, however, do not necessarily 
create state action.”). 
248 The Hill-Burton Act, passed by Congress in 1946, provided hospitals, nursing homes, and 
other health facilities funding for construction and modernization in exchange for an 
agreement to provide a reasonable volume of services to individuals unable to pay.  While 
the program stopped providing funds in 1997, approximately 200 health care facilities 
nationwide must still provide free or reduced-cost care as a result of these grants.  See Hill-
Burton Free and Reduced Cost Health Care, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/hillburton/default.htm (providing additional background on the 
implications of the Hill-Burton Act); see also Blumstein, supra note 231, at 1360–61 (dis-
cussing the implications of the federal government’s Hill-Burton construction program). 
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Kottmyer v. Maas serves as an example of this judicial stance.  In 
Kottmyer, an infant was born with severe brain damage in a hospital 
that was operating pursuant to licensing and authority of state and 
federal governments.249  The infant’s parents alleged that the hospital 
and a hospital social worker were state actors at the time the harm 
occurred, and therefore subject to constitutional constraints.250  How-
ever, the court held that the fact that the hospital was operating pur-
suant to government licensing requirements did not establish that it 
was a state actor.251  Thus, the parents could not claim any constitu-
tional violation.252  Similarly, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Sullivan, the Court found that there was no state action in 
private insurers’ decisions to withhold payment pursuant to a state 
regulatory scheme because the ultimate insurance decisions could 
not be attributed to the state.253 
If the government uses comparative effectiveness research find-
ings to guide its licensing restrictions, the cases examined in this sec-
tion suggest that such use of CER results would not be unconstitu-
tional.  These cases also suggest that it is constitutionally permissible 
for the government to infringe on access to health care treatment op-
tions, at least to a certain extent, through the use of licensing restric-
tions.  Thus, the government may be successful in using licensing re-
quirements to constrain health care practices and the actions of 
private parties so as to conform with CER findings, even where gov-
ernment licensing requirements infringe to some extent on funda-
mental rights.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Comparative effectiveness research has emerged at the frontlines 
of the health care debate as perhaps the most important component 
of the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.254  It is be-
 
249 See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing the circumstances of 
the daughter’s death). 
250 See id. at 688 (indicating the parents’ argument for considering the hospital and its em-
ployees to be state actors). 
251 See id. (holding that neither the hospital nor its employees should be considered state 
actors). 
252 See id. (indicating that the fact that the hospital and social worker operate pursuant to 
government licensing requirements was insufficient to establish that their actions consti-
tuted state action). 
253 See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999) (determining that “an in-
surer’s decision to withhold payment and seek utilization review of the reasonableness 
and necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly attributable to the State”). 
254 See supra notes 7–8. 
Mar. 2011] CER AND HEALTH REFORM 865 
 
lieved that new CER results will contribute substantially to the goal of 
personalizing medicine by elucidating which health care treatment 
options are safest and most effective for patients with varying genetic 
makeup.  CER also has the potential to help rein in escalating health 
care costs.  In the immediate future, CER can contribute to this goal 
by affording private entities a wealth of safety and effectiveness in-
formation that can be plugged into their own cost-effectiveness ana-
lyses and utilized.255  At some point in the future, the U.S. government 
may also seek to incorporate a cost-effectiveness component directly 
into the comparative effectiveness research that it presently sponsors, 
which could help wring further savings from our health care system. 
While proponents of CER tout its ability to save money while en-
suring safe and effective care, opponents argue its use will disincentiv-
ize innovation, allow government intrusion into patient-provider rela-
tionships, and signal the beginning of health care rationing.256  This 
Comment has examined whether government use of comparative ef-
fectiveness research findings to influence Americans’ access to vari-
ous health care treatment options would be found constitutional by 
the courts.  This issue is of critical importance in light of the newly 
passed health care reform legislation, which includes provisions fo-
cused on CER, and the funding cordoned off for CER in the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  It is also important because 
there remain strong opponents of CER who are likely to raise consti-
tutional challenges to government efforts to utilize CER findings. 
The discussion presented indicates that such opponents will have 
very few constitutional claims on which to protect health services, 
practices, facilities, and stakeholders from government decisions to 
ban or restrict access to health care treatment options on the basis of 
CER findings.  However, some legal protections do exist if the gov-
ernment attempts to deny access to certain treatment options on the 
basis of race or gender, and some protections for individuals on the 
basis of age have been incorporated into the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.  Yet overall, the conclusion that the government 
will have fairly broad authority to utilize CER findings without fear of 
constitutional challenge will undoubtedly be viewed by CER propo-
nents as a major victory for health care reform. 
This Comment has discussed how the government could attempt 
to ban or restrict access to health treatment options on the basis of 
 
255 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing how comparative effectiveness re-
search is expected to save money in the health care system). 
256 See Keckley & Frink, supra note 50, at 73-78 (describing why some stakeholders oppose the 
use of comparative effectiveness research). 
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CER findings.  While an outright government ban on certain health 
treatment options may seem unlikely, imposition of Medicare or Me-
dicaid restrictions on reimbursement for certain health treatment op-
tions deemed less safe or effective on the basis of comparative effec-
tiveness research is a real possibility in the near future.  For some 
Americans, a restriction on coverage will effectively be a denial of 
access.  And it is of course critical to bear in mind that government 
decisions about health care coverage will influence what private in-
surers are willing to cover.257 
In a country that values freedom of choice, the question remains 
whether the American public will be ready for the government to ex-
ercise greater control over access to health care treatment options.  
Given the massive impact that use of these findings could have on 
access to various medical treatment options, the government may be 
well-advised to consider whether additional protections surrounding 
the use of CER findings are warranted.  For instance, if certain medi-
cal treatment options can be identified as particularly valuable to or 
desired by many Americans, such as mammograms for women under 
age fifty,258 state or federal legislatures may wish to consider acting 
preemptively to afford these treatment options special protections 
through new legislation.  While guidelines would need to be carefully 
constructed to ensure that such a system is not abused and that it re-
flects important underlying policy goals, such a system could play an 
important role in ensuring that the benefits of harnessing CER find-
ings for health care decision making are maximized, while the poten-
tial harms are kept at bay. 
 
 
257 Editorial, Is Newer Better?  Not Always, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at WK10. 
258 See Gina Kolata, Panel Urges Mammograms at 50, Not 40, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/health/17cancer.html (discussing the debate 
over whether to heed new mammography guidelines as provided by the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force). 
